Chromeを用いてe-Gov法令検索において法令を画面右端で折り返す方法

 授業中にコンパクト六法等に掲載されていない規則等をPCを用いて画面等に映す場合があります。従前、文字を大きくして画面等に映すことができました。しかし、最近、この際に、文字を大きくしようとしても、横幅が980ピクセルで固定されてしまうために、文字を大きくすると、画面に条文がすべて映らない(折り返しされない)という問題が起きるようになりました。

 ブラウザとしてChromeを用いる場合には、次の手順でこれを回避することができます。

  • マウスを移動させるとクリックでチェックを外すことができるので、チェックを外す。

  • 画面端で改行されるようになる。

MacTeX 2018へのアップグレード

$ brew cask install mactex

$ sudo tlmgr repository add http://contrib.texlive.info/current tlcontrib

$ sudo tlmgr pinning add tlcontrib '*'

$ curl -fsSL https://www.preining.info/rsa.asc | sudo tlmgr key add -

$ sudo tlmgr install japanese-otf-nonfree ptex-fontmaps-macos  cjk-gs-integrate-macos japanese-otf-uptex-nonfree

$ sudo cjk-gs-integrate --cleanup --link-texmf

$ sudo cjk-gs-integrate-macos --force --link-texmf

$ sudo mktexlsr

$ kanji-config-updmap status

$ kanji-config-updmap-user toppanbunkyu-highsierra

SEC, Press Release, SEC Proposes to Enhance Protections and Preserve Choice for Retail Investors in Their Relationships With Investment Professionals (Apr. 18, 2018)

Under proposed Regulation Best Interest, a broker-dealer would be required to act in the best interest of a retail customer when making a recommendation of any securities transaction or investment strategy involving securities to a retail customer. Regulation Best Interest is designed to make it clear that a broker-dealer may not put its financial interests ahead of the interests of a retail customer in making recommendations.

In addition to the proposed enhancements to the standard of conduct for broker-dealers in Regulation Best Interest, the Commission proposed an interpretation to reaffirm and, in some cases, clarify the Commission’s views of the fiduciary duty that investment advisers owe to their clients. By highlighting principles relevant to the fiduciary duty, investment advisers and their clients would have greater clarity about advisers’ legal obligations.

Next, the Commission proposed to help address investor confusion about the nature of their relationships with investment professionals through a new short-form disclosure document — a customer or client relationship summary. Form CRS would provide retail investors with simple, easy-to-understand information about the nature of their relationship with their investment professional, and would supplement other more detailed disclosures. For advisers, additional information can be found in Form ADV. For broker-dealers, disclosures of the material facts relating to the scope and terms of the relationship would be required under Regulation Best Interest.

Finally, the Commission proposed to restrict certain broker-dealers and their financial professionals from using the terms “adviser” or “advisor” as part of their name or title with retail investors. Investment advisers and broker-dealers would also need to disclose their registration status with the Commission in certain retail investor communications.

via Benjamin P. Edwards

Fernan Restrepo, Judicial Deference, Procedural Protections, and Deal Outcomes in Freezeout Transactions: Evidence from the Effect of MFW

This work next explores the effect of MFW on the gains of the target shareholders, as measured by the premium over market prices, the cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of the transaction, and the change from the buyer’s first offer to the final offer. This part of the analysis considers two hypotheses. The first hypothesis predicts that the gains of the target should be higher after MFW because shareholder voting acts as a check against negligent or captured boards, and even if boards discharged appropriately their fiduciary duties, the target shareholders can still use the threat of a veto to push acquirers to raise their offer (Subramanian, 2005, 15; Edelman and Thomas, 2015, 468; Jiang, Li, and Mei, 2016). As a result, the fact that MFW effectively incentivized MOM conditions should lead to an upward pressure on deal prices. The second hypothesis suggests, in contrast, that the target gains should remain similar after MFW because freezoeuts were already subject to significant scrutiny before 2013, and judicial scrutiny appears to be an effective substitute for procedural protections (Subramanian, 2007; Restrepo, 2013; Restrepo and Subramanian, 2015). As discussed in Section 4, the results generally support this hypothesis.