米国の証券市場は不正に操作されているのか

マイケル・ルイスMichael Lewisの最新作を基にした60 Minutesのビデオです。とても面白いです。

〔2014年4月3日追記〕少し古いですが,BusinessWeekの「注文がどのように処理されるのか」も掲げておきます。

〔2014年4月6日追記〕今日の日経記事にVirtu Financialが取り上げられていました。その中で,損失を被った日が「1238日」のうち1日とありましたが,私が調べた限りでは,1278日のうち1日です。

The chart below illustrates our daily Adjusted Net Trading Income from January 1, 2009 through February 28, 2014. As a result of our real-time risk management strategy and technology, we had only one losing trading day during the period depicted, a total of 1,278 trading days.1

続きを読む

  1. Virtu Financial, Inc., Amendment to Registration Statement (Form S–1/A) (Mar. 27, 2014). []

More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure

「開示制度が必要かについて研究しています」というと,大半の場合,必要に決まっているじゃないかという反応が返ってくるのですが,行き過ぎた開示制度に疑義を示すビデオを見つけました。表題の書籍More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosureに関するプロモーションの一環のようです。当該書籍は,2014年4月13日発売で,amazon.co.jpamazon.comから購入できます。

Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 2014 Del. LEXIS 115 (Del. 2014)

Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp.判決は,2014年3月14日に下された,MacAndrews & ForbesによるMFWの少数株主排除の最高裁判決です。これによって,2013年5月19日に下された,衡平法裁判所のIn re MFW Shareholders Litigation, 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch. 2013)が維持されました1

速報ということで,判決の原文へのリンクを挙げておきます。

〔2014年3月19日追記〕M&A Law Prof Blogに次の指摘があります。参考になると思います。

But here’s a wrinkle…footnote 14. In footnote 14, the Supreme Court notes that MFW could not have decided on the pleadings and would have survived a motion to dismiss even under the new standard. The pleadings, the court noted were sufficient to require discovery on all the new prerequisiting in the application of the standard…

Ultimately we’ll see to what degree footnote 14 matters. But, it does seem a little disconcerting that Strine’s project to provide a pathway to early dismissal of these kinds of cases might just move the locus of the argument to the functioning of the special committee.

Sure, that’s obviously better, but it’s not yet clear that MFW and footnote 14 will dramatically reduce incentives to bring these cases. Perhaps we will just be battling the same fight on new ground. Of course, the Chancery Court is likely to want to find ways to rule on the pleadings and my guess is that now that Chief Justice Strine is in a place to influence how the MFW standard is going to roll out that he won’t be looking to increase incentives for plaintiffs to bring these cases.

判決の脚注14は,次の通り述べています。

The Verified Consolidated Class Action Complaint would have survived a motion to dismiss under this new standard. First, the complaint alleged that Perelman’s offer “value[d] the company at just four times” MFW’s profits per share and “five times 2010 pre-tax cash flow,” and that these ratios were “well below” those calculated for recent similar transactions. Second, the complaint alleged that the final Merger price was two dollars per share lower than the trading price only about two months earlier. Third, the complaint alleged particularized facts indicating that MWF’s share price was depressed at the times of Perelman’s offer and the Merger announcement due to short-term factors such as MFW’s acquisition of other entities and Standard & Poor’s downgrading of the United States’ creditworthiness. Fourth, the complaint alleged that commentators viewed both Perelman’s initial \$24 per share offer and the final \$25 per share Merger price as being surprisingly low. These allegations about the sufficiency of the price call into question the adequacy of the Special Committee’s negotiations, thereby necessitating discovery on all of the new prerequisites to the application of the business judgment rule.

via M&A Law Prof Blog

  1. 原審判決については,例えば,金融商品取引法ブログに「MFW判決(1)」および「MFW判決(2)」という記事があります。 []

論文

Jonathan Macey教授とSullivan & Cromwell LLPのアソシエイトであるJoshua Mitts氏による法人格否認に関する論文です。

要約は,次の通りです。

Few doctrines are more shrouded in mystery and yet more litigated than piercing the corporate veil. We develop a new theoretical taxonomy which postulates that veil-piercing decisions fall into three categories: (1) achieving the purpose of a statutory or regulatory scheme, (2) preventing shareholders from obtaining credit by misrepresentation, and (3) promoting the bankruptcy values of achieving the orderly, efficient resolution of a bankrupt’s estate. We analyze the facts of several veil-piercing cases to show how the outcomes are explained by the three theories we put forth and show that undercapitalization is rarely, if ever, an independent grounds for piercing the corporate veil.

In addition, we employ modern quantitative machine learning methods never before utilized in legal scholarship to analyze the full text of 9,380 judicial opinions. We demonstrate that our theories systematically predict veil-piercing outcomes, the widely-invoked rationale of “undercapitalization” of the business poorly explains these cases, and our theories most closely reflect the textual structure of the opinions.

via Business Law Prof. Blog, 武蔵野日記