デラウェア州における株式会社以外の会社における訴訟費用の敗訴原告負担を定める附属定款の有効性について(積極)およびその射程—ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 2014 WL 1847446 (Del. May 8, 2014)

This Opinion constitutes the Court’s response to four certified questions of law concerning the validity of a fee-shifting provision in a Delaware non-stock corporation’s bylaws. The provision, which the directors adopted pursuant to their charter-delegated power to unilaterally amend the bylaws, shifts attorneys’ fees and costs to unsuccessful plaintiffs in intra-corporate litigation. The United States District Court for the District of Delaware found that the bylaw provision’s validity was an open question under Delaware law and certified four questions to this Court, asking it to decide whether, and under what circumstances, such a provision is valid and enforceable. Although we cannot directly address the bylaw at issue, we hold that fee-shifting provisions in a non-stock corporation’s bylaws can be valid and enforceable under Delaware law.

New Section 331 is intended to confirm and codify the limited liability nature of corporations by expressly stating that provisions in a certificate of incorporation or bylaw may not impose monetary liability on stockholders, except in the very limited circumstances already provided for in the Delaware General Corporation Law. In ATP Tours, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund (No. 534, 2013, May 8, 2014), the Delaware Supreme Court upheld as facially valid a bylaw imposing liability for legal fees on certain members of a non-stock corporation who participated in the litigation. Together with the amendments to Section 114, new Section 331 is intended to limit applicability of that holding to non-stock corporations, and to make clear that such liability may not be imposed on holders of stock in stock corporations.

〔2014年6月24日追記〕

WSJ曰く:

The Delaware legislature has postponed until early 2015 discussion of a proposed bill that had drawn heat from the Chamber, among others, the bill’s sponsor confirmed Wednesday. … “I certainly believe that we should not permit companies carte blanche to adopt these kinds of bylaws,” Sen. Bryan Townsend, who sponsored the bill, said in an interview. “But we have heard from a broad group of stakeholders and thought it best to take the coming months to continue our examination of the issue.”

Bryan Townsent氏は,Davis Polkのsummer associateの頃に会ったことがあります。その後,彼は政治の道を選んだので,結局,DPWには入所しなかったのですが,既に州議会のsenatorとは。

via Westlaw, Francis Pileggi

持分会社の法人格否認—Kubican v. The Tavern, LLC, 2012 WL 8523515 (W. Va. Cir. Ct.)

昨年の事案ですが,West Virginiaで,LLCの法人格否認が認めた事案があります

Does West Virginia’s version of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, codified at W. Va. Code § 31B el seq., afford complete protection to members of a limited liability company against a plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil? — ANSWER: YES

探すと色々あって面白そうです。各州でLLCが採用されて,下級審判決が出て,そろそろ各州の最高裁という時期なのかもしれません。

This, of course, assumes the doctrine of veil piercing even applies to limited liability companies under Kentucky law. While several decisions have assumed that it does, see Stettenbenz v. Butch’s Rod Shop, LLC, 2012–CA–001405–MR, 2013 WL 4779862 (Ky.App. Sept. 6, 2013) (unpublished), the question appears to have been raised in only one case, Howell Contractors, Inc. v. Berling,383 S.W.3d 465, 466 (Ky.App.2012), which ultimately avoided the question by applying Ohio law, which does allow veil piercing of LLCs. There are, of course, strong arguments for why LLC veil piercing should not be allowed, see generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 U. Ill. L.Rev. 77 (2005), even when corporate veil piercing is viable in the jurisdiction, see Thomas E. Rutledge & Lady E. Booth, The Limited Liability Company Act: Understanding Kentucky’s New Organizational Option, 83 Ky. L.J. 1, 17 n. 73 (1995) (“An issue to be considered is the degree to which the common law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil should apply to LLCs. While the use of the LLC’s liability shield should not be permitted to protect wrongdoers, the application of the law that has developed in this area is questionable.”).

via Business Law Prof Blog

Manchester Unitedの次期監督をめぐる(非)効率的市場

2014年4月22日にManchester UnitedのDavid Moyes監督が解任されました。株価の変動 (NYSE: MANU)は,次の通りです。

after April 22, 2014 (David Moyes was sacked)

次期監督候補についてのブックメーカーのオッズを見ると,ブックメーカーによってオッズが結構違うことが明らかです。

ただ,情報に市場が反応しているのは,わかります。

また,誰が監督になって欲しいかというファンの希望と,オッズにも乖離があって,それも興味深いです。

Who do you want as the next Man United boss?

via Guardian, Independent, Telegraph, BBC Sports, Mirror