In Re PLX Technology Inc. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. 9880-VCL (October 16, 2018)

This massive decision is a primer on Delaware director fiduciary duty. It covers just about all the important issues, with an enormous amount of citations and explanation. It is particularly helpful in showing how directors must meet their disclosure obligations, both to their other directors and to stockholders. It is, of course, very much a product of its unique facts.

What may be its most lasting impact is its conclusion that the deal price in a merger established fair value and that yet again a DCF analysis was defective. At least for publicly traded and well shopped companies, we may be seeing the end of DCF as the preferred measure of value in Delaware. (emphasis added)

via Morris James

Annual Review of Key Delaware Corporate and Commercial Decisions 2016

Francis G.X.Pileggi writes:

Delaware Supreme Court

  • Hazout v. Tsang

  • Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec.

  • OptimisCorp v. Waite.

  • El Paso Pipeline GP Co., LLC v. Brinckerhoff

Delaware Court of Chancery

  • Marino v. Patriot Rail Company LLC.

  • In Re Trulia Inc. Stockholder Litigation.

  • Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc.

  • Obeid v. Hogan

  • Medicalgorithmics S.A. v. AMI Monitoring, Inc.

  • Bizzarri v. Suburban Waste Services, Inc.

  • Larkin v. Shah.

Morris James:

  • In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016)

  • Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151 (Del. 2016) (ORDER); In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litigation, 143 A.3d 727 (Del. Ch. 2016); Larkin v. Shah, 2016 WL 4485447 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2016)

  • Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo!, Inc., 132 A.3d 752 (Del. Ch. 2016)

  • Hazout v. Tsang, 134 A.3d 274 (Del. 2016)

  • Sandys v. Pincus, 2016 WL 7094027 (Del. Dec. 5, 2016)

  • In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc., 2016 WL 3186538 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016)

  • In re Books-A-Million Stockholder Litigation, 2016 WL 5874974 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2016)

  • In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 2016 WL 2908344 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2016)

  • El Paso Pipeline GP Company LLC v. Brinckerhoff, 2016 WL 7380418 (Del. Dec. 20, 2016)

via Francis G.X.Pileggi

完全な基準が適用される事案で利益相反のない取締役に関して訴え却下の申し立てが認められなかった事例—In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. Stockholder Litigation 2014 WL 4418169 (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 2014)

In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. Stockholder Litigation, 2014 WL 4418169 (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 2014)は,支配株主が行った少数株主のフリーズアウトの取引に関して完全な基準が適用される事案で,定款にデラウェア州一般会社法102条(b)項(7)号の定めがあるにも拘わらず,利益相反のない取締役に関して訴え却下の申し立てが認められなかった事例です。

Sullivan & Cromwellのニュースレターでの要約は,次の通りです。

In an opinion issued on September 9, 2014, the Delaware Court of Chancery (VC Glasscock) held that in a controlling stockholder freeze-out merger subject to entire fairness review at the outset, disinterested directors entitled under a company’s charter to exculpation for duty of care violations cannot prevail in a motion to dismiss even though the claims against them for breach of fiduciary duty are not pled with particularity; instead, the issue of whether they will be entitled to exculpation must await a developed record, post-trial. The decision once again highlights the litigation cost that will be imposed on companies engaged in controlling stockholder freeze-out mergers for failing to employ both of the safeguards that Delaware has endorsed to ensure business judgment, instead of entire fairness, review— (1) an up-front non-waivable commitment by the controller to condition the transaction on an informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders and (2) approval of the transaction by a well-functioning and broadly empowered special committee of disinterested directors. At the motion to dismiss stage, disinterested directors effectively will be treated in the same manner as controllers and their affiliated directors.

via Sullivan & Cromwell, Francis Pileggi

訴訟費用の敗訴原告負担を定める附属定款(fee-shifting bylaws) (2)

大した進捗ではないのですが,幾つかのリンクを纏めておきます。

続きを読む

Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013)

Boilermakers Local 154 v. Chevron, 2013 WL — (Del. Ch. June 25, 2013)は,裁判地を定める附属定款の有効性が争われた事案ですが,有効とされました。実際に規定された条項(修正後)は次のようなものです。

Unless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an alternative forum, the sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director, officer or other employee of the Corporation to the Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action asserting a claim arising pursuant to any provision of the Delaware General Corporation Law, or (iv) any action asserting a claim governed by the internal affairs doctrine shall be a state or federal court located within the state of Delaware, in all cases subject to the court’s having personal jurisdiction over the indispensible parties named as defendants. Any person or entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any interest in shares of capital stock of the Corporation shall be deemed to have notice of and consented to the provisions of this [bylaw].

第一感では,そんなに広範な条項でもないと思えるのですが,どうなのでしょうか。長期的にstate competitionに与える影響が気になります。

via M&A Law Prof Blog, Morris Nicholas Delaware Alert, The D&O Diary