DFC Global Decided

The respondent argues that we should establish, by judicial gloss, a presumption that in certain cases involving arm’s-length mergers, the price of the transaction giving rise to appraisal rights is the best estimate of fair value. We decline to engage in that act of creation, which in our view has no basis in the statutory text, which gives the Court of Chancery in the first instance the discretion to “determine the fair value of the shares” by taking into account “all relevant factors.”

… [W]e do not share DFC’s confidence in our ability to craft, on a general basis, the precise pre-conditions that would be necessary to invoke a presumption of that kind. We also see little need to do so, given the proven record of our Court of Chancery in exercising its discretion to give the deal price predominant, and indeed exclusive weight, when it determines, based on the precise facts before it that led to the transaction, that the deal price is the most reliable evidence of fair value. …

… Although there is no presumption in favor of the deal price, under the conditions found by the Court of Chancery, economic principles suggest that the best evidence of fair value was the deal price, as it resulted from an open process, informed by robust public information, and easy access to deeper, non-public information, in which many parties with an incentive to make a profit had a chance to bid. . .

株式買取請求権と取引価格

In the last couple of years, at the Chancery Court, chancellors have started moving away from the view that the court will determine fair value without regard to the merger price. Now, in certain circumstances (where the deal price is a product of a competitive or robust sales price) chancellors may consider merger price as one of the relevant factors for purposes of determining fair value.

Now this question has found its way to the Delaware Supreme Court and the parties are lining up on both sides. There are even amici! Two sets of amici have rolled up: on the one side there are law professors arguing that the court should be able to presumptively rely on merger price to determine fair value in an appraisal proceeding unless that price does not result from arm’s length bargaining (DFC Holdings – Bainbridge, et al). On the other are law professors arguing requiring a court to rely on merger price to determine fair value would run counter to the language of the statutory appraisal remedy and also not always reflect fair value (DFC Holdings – Talley, et al.

DFC Globalの件では、既に、amicus breifを紹介しておりますが、引用されているもののうち後者のamicus briefは、次のような書き出しです。こちらのbriefも錚々たる教授陣です。私は、独立当事者間の株式買取請求権の公正な価格が、取引価格に縛られないと思っているので、後者のbriefに親近感を覚えます。

Appellant urges the Court to adopt a rule of law in appraisal proceedings that presumptively requires the Court of Chancery to defer exclusively to the transaction price unless that price does not result from an arm’s-length process. Amici disagree: Doing so would be a trifecta of bad law, bad economics, and bad policy.

via Brian JM Quinn

Professors Weigh In On DFC Global Appeal

〔2017年1月1日追記〕

The Law Professors admit that they “have no financial interest or direct personal interest in this case.” Mot. ¶ 1. Rather, they are interlopers desperately seeking a forum in which they can pursue their academic fantasy by suggesting that this Court rewrite Delaware’s judicial appraisal statute, 8 Del. C. § 262(h), and effectively overrule settled law concerning the Chancery Court’s broad discretion in determining the fair value of dissenting stockholders’ shares in an appraisal action.

〔2017年1月9日追記〕

via Lowenstein Sandler, Lowenstein Sandler