Jonathan R. Macey & Joshua Mitts, Asking the Right Question: The Statutory Right of Appraisal and Efficient Markets, SSRN (2018)

We contend that courts should look at the market price of the securities of a target company whose shares are being valued, unadjusted for the news of the merger, rather than at the deal price that was reached by the parties in the transaction.

Unadjusted market price has two distinct advantages over deal price. First, the unadjusted market price automatically subtracts the target firm’s share of the synergy gains and agency cost reductions impounded in the deal price. This is appropriate to do because dissenting shareholders in appraisal proceedings are not entitled to these increments of value which are supplied by the bidder. Second, the unadjusted market price is unaffected by any flaws in the deal process that led to the ultimate merger agreement. Recently, commentators have contended that deal prices in merger transactions should be ignored in appraisal cases where there are flaws in the process that led to the sale.

Salman v. United States

Stanford Law ReviewがSalman v. United Statesについて、オンラインシンポジウムを開催しています。以下の5名の著者のエッセーが読めます。

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Shareholder Rights Projectについての議論

Harvard大学のShareholder Rights Projectは,期差選任の上場会社を減少させるという成果を短期間で挙げたため,注目される存在だと思います。同プロジェクトの活動の合法性について疑義を表する論文が,スタンフォード大学の教授および現役の連邦証券取引委員会の委員から呈されました。

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アクティビスト(の影響)は近視眼的か

via Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation

Yale大学における国際金融に関するカンファレンス(2013)

Yale大学におけるSullivan & Cromwell Conference on Challenges in Global Financial Servicesと題された国際金融に関するカンファレンスです。幾つかのビデオがありあます。

  • Panel I: Bank Capital and Liquidity Requirements

パネリストは次の通りです。

  • Stijn Claessens, Assistant Director, Research Department, International Monetary Fund
  • Michael H. Krimminger, Partner, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP and former General Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
  • Andrew Metrick, Deputy Dean for Faculty Development & Michael H. Jordan Professor of Finance and Management, Yale School of Management
  • Roberta Romano ’80, Sterling Professor of Law and Director, Yale Law School Center for the Study of Corporate Law
  • Moderator: Ian Ayres ’86, William K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale Law School

  • Panel II: Bank Transparency and the Financial Crisis

パネリストは次の通りです。

  • Robert J. Giuffra, Jr. ’87, Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
  • Gary B. Gorton, Frederick Frank Class of 1954 Professor of Management and Finance, Yale School of Management
  • Henry T. C. Hu ’79, Allan Shivers Chair in the Law of Banking and Finance, University of Texas Law School, and former Director, Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
  • Frederick Schauer, David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law
  • Moderator: Donald Kohn, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution and former Vice Chairman, Federal Reserve Board

  • Panel III: Accountability and Structuring of Systemically Important Financial Institutions

パネリストは次の通りです。

  • H. Rodgin Cohen, Senior Chairman, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
  • Edward J. Kane, Professor of Finance, Boston College
  • Andrew W. Lo, Charles E. and Susan T. Harris Professor, MIT Sloan School of Management and Director, MIT Laboratory for Financial Engineering
  • John F. Simonson, Deputy Director for Systemic Resolution Planning and Implementation, Office of Complex Financial Institutions, FDIC
  • Moderator: Henry B. Hansmann ’74, Oscar M. Ruebhausen Professor of Law, Yale Law School

  • Panel IV: Cross-Border Resolution

パネリストは次の通りです。

  • James W. Giddens ’66, Chair, Corporate Reorganization and Bankruptcy Group, Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP and Liquidation Trustee, Lehman Brothers Inc. and MF Global Inc.
  • Seth Grosshandler, Partner, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
  • Richard J. Herring, Jacob Safra Professor of International Banking & Professor of Finance, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
  • Jonathan R. Macey ’82, Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance, and Securities Law, Yale Law School
  • Moderator: John D. Morley ’06, Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School

論文

Jonathan Macey教授とSullivan & Cromwell LLPのアソシエイトであるJoshua Mitts氏による法人格否認に関する論文です。

要約は,次の通りです。

Few doctrines are more shrouded in mystery and yet more litigated than piercing the corporate veil. We develop a new theoretical taxonomy which postulates that veil-piercing decisions fall into three categories: (1) achieving the purpose of a statutory or regulatory scheme, (2) preventing shareholders from obtaining credit by misrepresentation, and (3) promoting the bankruptcy values of achieving the orderly, efficient resolution of a bankrupt’s estate. We analyze the facts of several veil-piercing cases to show how the outcomes are explained by the three theories we put forth and show that undercapitalization is rarely, if ever, an independent grounds for piercing the corporate veil.

In addition, we employ modern quantitative machine learning methods never before utilized in legal scholarship to analyze the full text of 9,380 judicial opinions. We demonstrate that our theories systematically predict veil-piercing outcomes, the widely-invoked rationale of “undercapitalization” of the business poorly explains these cases, and our theories most closely reflect the textual structure of the opinions.

via Business Law Prof. Blog, 武蔵野日記