Martin Lipton Memos (2017)

  • Martin Lipton, Memos (2017)

 米国の組織再編法制の実務に影響を与え,また,近年では,企業統治の分野でも影響力を発揮している,Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katzの弁護士であるMartin Lipton氏のメモランダムを集めたものです。Lipton氏のメモランダムは,教科書や論文などで引用されることがあるのですが,古いものについては原文を入手することが困難なことが多かったように思います。

 私は,ニューヨーク大学でWachtell Liptonの弁護士(David A. Katz氏とMark Gordon氏)による企業買収の講義を受講し,そこで幾つかのメモランダムが配られてから,Lipton氏のメモランダムを興味深く拝見してきました。本ブログでも,Lipton氏のメモランダムについて,度々言及しています。しかし,Lipton氏の執筆に係るメモランダムをすべて拝見したということではありませんでした。例えば,1988年11月3日の “The Interco Case” と題するメモランダムは,このPDFを見つけるまで拝見することができませんでした。このメモランダムは,Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1931, 1959 n.95 (1991),Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588, 626 (2003)などの論文で引用されています。今回,このメモランダムも含めて,Lipton氏の様々なメモランダムを読むことができるということで,紹介をいたします。デラウェア州会社法の歴史の実務の側面を垣間見ることができました。

Can Delaware Be Dethroned?

Delaware is the state of incorporation for almost two-thirds of the Fortune 500 companies, as well as more than half of all companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and other major stock exchanges. This gives Delaware a seemingly unchallengeable position as the dominant producer of US corporate law. In recent years, however, some observers have suggested that Delaware’s competitive position is eroding. Other states have long tried to chip away at Delaware’s position, and recent Delaware legal developments may have strengthened the case for incorporating outside Delaware. More important, however, the federal government increasingly is preempting corporate governance law. The contributors to this volume are leading academics and practitioners with decades of experience in Delaware corporate law. They bring together a variety of perspectives that collectively provide the reader with a broad understanding of how Delaware achieved its dominant position and the threats it faces.

州間競争

Prior studies document a Delaware incorporation effect on firm valuation, generally using Tobin’s Q, but the directional effects are mixed and inconclusive. Our study uses implied cost of equity to assess valuation, and we find consistent evidence 1 that firms incorporated outside of their home state, either in Delaware or in other states, have a cost of equity that is 40 to 100 basis points higher than firms incorporated in their home state (depending on the model). Importantly, [2] there is no statistical difference between Delaware incorporation and other non-home states of incorporation, which suggest the more important distinction is home state versus non-home state, rather than a Delaware effect. These findings are robust to controls for risk factors that affect the cost of equity including market beta, market value of equity, book to market ratio, analyst forecast dispersion, long-term growth in earnings, and industry membership. Results are consistent in yearly estimations for the sample period 1990-2006, and robust across the spectrum of firm size, different measures of cost of equity, and to control for endogeneity of the firms’ incorporation choice.

トービンのQではなく、implied cost of capitalを用いる場合、次のことが言える。

  • 州外に設立した会社と州内に設立した会社との間で40から100ベーシス・ポイントの差がある。
  • デラウェア州の会社と州外の設立との間には、統計的に有意な差はない。

Brian R. Cheffins教授ほかによる会社設立準拠法市場における競争(state competition)に関する論文

米国における最も重要な会社法に関する主題に関する論文です。この論文が既存の議論に与える影響は,管見にして不明ですが,Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 679, 724 (2002)の結果と整合的なものとなっています。

Our findings correspondingly confirm conjectures that meaningful competition between states in the corporate law realm has now long since ended and amounts not to a race but a leisurely walk.1

via ProfessorBainbridge.com

  1. Brian R. Cheffins, Steven A. Bank & Harwell Wellsc, The Race to the Bottom Recalculated: Scoring Corporate Law Over Time 7 (2014) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2475242. []

SECとデラウェア州会社法の関係

J. Robert Brown Jr. writes:

The traditional division was that the SEC had responsibility for disclosure; Delaware for substance. Substance included fiduciary standards designed to regulate the behavior of directors.

This was never an entirely accurate description. For one thing, the SEC has long tried to use disclosure to regulate substantive behavior. …

Delaware, however, may be losing its semi-monopoly in this area. A review of recent cases by the SEC suggests a more aggressive role in determining standards for directors.

via The Race to the Bottom