William T. Allen (1948–2019)

 Allen教授は、1985年にデラウェア州の衡平法裁判所の大法官(Chancellor)に任命され、以後、12年の任期中に多数の有名な判決を執筆されました。2006年にニューヨーク大学のLL.M.プログラムに入学した際には、会社法プログラムのディレクターでした。

 Intercoは、Allen教授が大法官として執筆されたものの中で(その後最高裁判所に否定されているにもかかわらず)私のお気に入りの判決です。ニューヨーク大学在学中のlunchonセミナーの講演者が「デラウェア州最高裁判所がAllen裁判官の判決を覆したとしても、Allen裁判官がいつも正しい」というようなこといったのが印象に残っています。Allen裁判官のお話は、時に深淵で難しく、その真意を理解することが難しいことがありましたが、Interco判決の素晴らしさを含めて、今思い出して漸く意味が分かることも多いです。

 ニューヨーク大学でのKahan教授とAllen教授の演習では、Kahan教授に一歩も引かずに議論をされていました。スーツが良く似合い、多弁で、Blackberryを腰に下げていて、多忙な実務家を体現していました。演習の中のAllen先生の言葉で印象的なのは、会社法学で重要なのは、エージェンシー理論と情報の非対称性だと仰っていたことです。私が、エージェンシー理論と情報の非対称性にこだわるのは、この影響が強いように思います。

 私にとって、Allen教授は、とてもチャーミングな方で、いかめしそうな大法官という役職とは無縁な方でした。演習で、Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 973 (2002)を報告した際に、同論文の中に出てきたAllen大法官の「Omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests」という一文を紹介したのですが、Allen先生は、鼻のしたをこすり、また、胸を張って誇らしげでした。そのコミカルなリアクションのおかげで報告の場がなごみました。また、卒業式のセレモニーで、会社法専攻の学生は、Allen教授に名前を呼ばれるのですが、演習に参加していた私の名前を呼ぶ際に、ウインクしてくれたことを覚えています。卒業後は、ニューヨーク大学のLL.M.を受験する学生を推薦するメールを送るくらいしか関係がありませんでしたが、いつも丁寧なメールを返してくれました。教職についたあとは、そのことを祝福し、「Congratulations This is a wonderful job as you know!」というメッセージを送ってくださいました。

 実務と学問のバランスに配慮し、規範的な議論や法政策に基づく議論をすることが重要であることを教えてくれましたし、今後もAllen教授に学ぶことは多いように思います。ご冥福をお祈りいたします。

via WLRK, Delaware Business Now, Delaware Judiciary, Chancery Daily, Professor Bainbridge, John C. Coffee Jr., Ronald J. Gilson, Jack B. Jacobs, Theodore N. Mirvis and Paul K. Rowe, Leo E. Strine Jr.,

リーマンショック前後のTOPIX

 リーマン・ブラザーズの破綻は,2008年9月15日(日)(米国時間)です。Wikipediaのリーマン・ショックの項目では,「日経平均株価も大暴落を起こし,9月12日(金曜日)の終値は12,214円だったが,10月28日には一時は6,000円台(6,994.90円)まで下落し,1982年(昭和57年)10月以来,26年ぶりの安値を記録した。」と記されています。日本の株価は,翌営業日から暴落したでしょうか。

 調べてみると,翌16日の株価の下落は,約5%に留まっています。しかも,9月24日の終値は,12日の終値の99%で,そこまで指標を戻しています。例えば,この間(例えば,2008年9月15日から9月24日まで)に株価が下落した日本の会社がある場合,その株価下落は,リーマン・ショックと関係があるものといえるでしょうか。

 例えば,もし,その会社がリーマン・ブラザーズと取引関係にあって損失を被るということであれば,株価の下落をリーマン・ショックと結びつけることは適切であるように思います。しかし,会社がリーマン・ブラザーズと取引関係を有しないような場合,日経平均やTOPIXを超える株価の下落が発生したとしても,リーマン・ショックと結びつけて株価が下落したとはいえないように思います。

Business Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation (Aug. 2019)

See also WLRK, WLRK

In re Appraisal of Jarden Corporation

Lowenstein Sandler writes:

By a July 19, 2019 ruling, Vice Chancellor Slights set the fair value of Jarden Corporation at its unaffected market price of $48.31, below the $59.21 per share value of cash and stock that Newell Rubbermaid had paid to acquire it. The court also performed a DCF analysis that corroborated its valuation. The court was critical of the merger process leading up to this deal and questioned the reliability of a merger-price-less-synergies approach given that factor as well as its findings that there was no pre-signing or post-signing market check and the evidence regarding deal synergies and how much, if at all, was received by Jarden, was conflicting and especially difficult to measure.

いわゆるuniversal proxyを用いて委任状勧誘を行い株主側の取締役が会社側の取締役と同時に選任された事例

WSJ:

EQT Corp. and the Rice group of shareholders, led by Toby Rice and Derek Rice, said shareholders at the company’s annual meeting Wednesday elected all seven Rice-nominated directors and five nominees supported by both entities. …

EQT is using a universal ballot for its shareholder vote, setting it up to be one of the few high-profile proxy fights to use such cards, which allow shareholders to pick from both sides’ nominees. Universal ballots can make it more likely a company will lose some board seats to a dissident but less likely they’ll lose a majority of seats.

 

 個人的に興味を持ったのが,会社側の取締役が選任されなかったこととによって株価が上昇したことです(直ぐに元の水準に戻ったようですが)。

The Street:

The stock of natural gas giant EQT Corp. (EQT – Get Report) jumped Wednesday after shareholders handed control of the board to an activist group led by former owners. Shares of the Pittsburgh company rose 2.5% to $16.05 after holders voted to award seven seats on the 12-member board to a group called the Rice Team.

via Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Bloomberg, Bloomberg, Bloomberg, WSJ, EDGAR, SandRidge

Regulation S-XのRules 3-05及び Article 11の改正提案

The Securities and Exchange Commission proposed amendments to the financial disclosure requirements in Rules 3-05, 3-14, and Article 11 of Regulation S-X, as well as related rules and forms, for financial statements of businesses acquired or to be acquired and for business dispositions. The Commission also proposed new Rule 6-11 of Regulation S-X and amendments to Form N-14 for financial reporting of acquisitions involving investment companies.

When a registrant acquires a significant business, other than a real estate operation, Rule 3-05 of Regulation S-X generally requires a registrant to provide separate audited annual and unaudited interim pre-acquisition financial statements of that business. The number of years of financial information that must be provided depends on the relative significance of the acquisition to the registrant. Similarly, Rule 3-14 of Regulation S-X addresses the unique nature of real estate operations and requires a registrant that has acquired a significant real estate operation to file financial statements with respect to such acquired operation.

 わが国で米国証券取引委員会への登録が強制されるのは、様式F–4による組織再編に関するものだというワーキング・ペーパーを書いたことがありますが、それとの関係で、今回の規則提案は、実務に影響を与えるように思えます。

株式買取請求権と株価——Verition Partners v. Aruba Networks, 2019 Del. LEXIS 197 (Del. Apr. 16, 2019)

In this statutory appraisal case, the Court of Chancery found that the fair value of Aruba Networks, Inc., as defined by 8 Del. C. § 262, was $17.13 per share, which was the thirty-day average market price at which its shares traded before the media reported news of the transaction that gave rise to the appellants’ appraisal rights. … Because the Court of Chancery’s decision to use Aruba’s stock price instead of the deal price minus synergies was rooted in an erroneous factual finding that lacked record support, we answer that in the positive and reverse the Court of Chancery’s judgment. On remand, the Court of Chancery shall enter a final judgment for the petitioners awarding them $19.10 per share, which reflects the deal price minus the portion of synergies left with the seller as estimated by the respondent in this case, Aruba. …

Likewise, assuming an efficient market, the unaffected market price and that price as adjusted upward by a competitive bidding process leading to a sale of the entire company was likely to be strong evidence of fair value. By asserting that Dell and DFC “indicate[] that Aruba’s unaffected market price is entitled to substantial weight,” the Vice Chancellor seemed to suggest that this Court signaled in both cases that trading prices should be treated as exclusive indicators of fair value. However, Dell and DFC did not imply that the market price of a stock was necessarily the best estimate of the stock’s so-called fundamental value at any particular time. Rather, they did recognize that when a market was informationally efficient in the sense that “the market’s digestion and assessment of all publicly available information concerning [the Company] [is] quickly impounded into the Company’s stock price,” the market price is likely to be more informative of fundamental value. In fact, Dell’s references to market efficiency focused on informational efficiency—the idea that markets quickly reflect publicly available information and can be a proxy for fair value—not the idea that an informationally efficient market price invariably reflects the company’s fair value in an appraisal or fundamental value in economic terms. Nonetheless, to the extent the Court of Chancery read DFC and Dell as reaffirming the traditional Delaware view, which is accepted in corporate finance, that the price a stock trades at in an efficient market is an important indicator of its economic value that should be given weight, it was correct. And to the extent that the Court of Chancery also read DFC and Dell as reaffirming the view that when that market price is further informed by the efforts of arm’s length buyers of the entire company to learn more through due diligence, involving confidential non-public information, and with the keener incentives of someone considering taking the non-diversifiable risk of buying the entire entity, the price that results from that process is even more likely to be indicative of so-called fundamental value, it was correct. …

Under the semi-strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, the unaffected market price is not assumed to factor in nonpublic information. In this case, however, HP had signed a confidentiality agreement, done exclusive due diligence, gotten access to material nonpublic information, and had a much sharper incentive to engage in price discovery than an ordinary trader because it was seeking to acquire all shares. Moreover, its information base was more current as of the time of the deal than the trading price used by the Vice Chancellor. Compounding these issues was the reality that Aruba was set to release strong earnings that HP knew about in the final negotiations, but that the market did not. As previously noted, Aruba’s stock price jumped 9.7% once those earnings were finally reported to the public. None of these issues were illuminated in the traditional way, and none of them were discussed by the Court of Chancery in a reasoned way in giving exclusive weight to a prior trading price that was $7.54 below what HP agreed to pay, and well below what Aruba had previously argued was fair value. (footnotes omitted)

via Steve Hecht, FT, Opinion, DealLawyers, Alison Frankel, Bloomberg Law, Matt Levine, The Chancery Daily, S&C, Potter Anderson, Morris James, CW&T, Ann Lipton, Baker Botts, PLC, Ropes & Gray, WSG&R, WF&G, Fried Frank, PWRW&G, Francis G.X. Pileggi