The Corporate Practice Commentatorが発表するThe Top 10 Corporate and Securities Articlesの過年度の結果を纏めました。

なお，会社法および証券法に関連して米国で発表された論文について，Top 10以外に役に立つ情報として，以下の情報が挙げられます。

• Most Cited Law Professors by Specialty, 2000-2007 2000年から2007年までのビジネス法の教授の論文引用数に基づくランキング
• The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time 米国で最も引用回数の多い論文の一覧
• 20 Most-Cited Corporate & Securities Law Faculty in the U.S., 2016-2020

更新履歴

• 2012年5月10日　遅くなりましたが2011年の結果について追加しました。
• 2013年5月10日　遅くなりましたが2012年の結果について追記しました。
• 2014年5月11日　2013年の結果について追記しました。
• 2015年5月12日　2014年の結果について追記しました。
• 2016年4月26日　2015年の結果について追記しました。
• 2017年4月30日　2016年の結果について追記しました。
• 2018年4月24日　2017年の結果について追記しました。
• 2019年5月1日　2018年の結果について追記しました。
• 2020年4月19日　2019年の結果について追記しました。
• 2021年4月21日　2020年の結果について追記しました。
• 2022年4月26日　2021年の結果について追記しました。

2021

• Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 106 Cornell L. Rev. 91–178 (2020)
• Quinn Curtis, Jill Fisch & Adriana Robertson, Do ESG Mutual Funds Deliver on Their Promises?, 120 Mich. L. Rev. 393 (2021)
• Colleen Honigsberg, Shivaram Rajgopal, Suraj Srinivasan, The Changing Landscape of Auditors’ Liability, 63 J.L. & Econ. 367–410 (2020)
• Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, The Giant Shadow of Corporate Gadflies, 94 S. Cal. L. Rev. 569-636 (2021)
• Da Lin, Beyond Beholden, 44 J. Corp. L. 515–558 (2019)
• Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The Corporate Governance Machine, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 2563–2634 (2021)
• Joshua Mitts, Short and Distort, 49 J. Legal Stud. 287–334 (2020)
• Mariana Pargendler, Veil Peeking: The Corporation as a Nexus for Regulation, 169 U. Pa. L. Rev. 717–782 (2021)
• Mark J. Roe, Corporate Purpose and Corporate Competition, 99 Wash. U.L. Rev. 223–270 (2021)
• Sarath Sanga, Network Effects in Corporate Governance, 63 J.L. & Econ. 1–42 (2020)
• Yesha Yadav, The Failed Regulation of U.S. Treasury Markets, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 1173-1250 (2021)

2020

• Robert Bartlett & Frank Partnoy, The Misuse of Tobin’s q, 73 Vand. L. Rev. 353–424 (2020)
• Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1243–1322 (2020)
• Matthew D. Cain, Sean J. Griffith, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Does Revlon Matter? An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 108 Cal. L. Rev. 1683–1731 (2020)
• Jared A. Ellias & Robert J. Stark, Bankruptcy Hardball, 108 Cal. L. Rev. 745–88 (2020)
• Sean J. Griffith, Deal Insurance: Representation and Warranty Insurance in Mergers and Acquisitions, 104 Minn. L. Rev. 1839–1920 (2020)
• C. Scott Hemphill & Marcel Kahan, The Strategies of Anticompetitive Common Ownership, 129 Yale L.J. 1392–1459 (2020)
• Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let Shareholders be Shareholders, 100 B.U. L. Rev. 1771 (2020)
• Ann M. Lipton, Not Everything Is about Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder Disclosure, 37 Yale J. on Reg. 499–572 (2020)
• Yaron Nili & Cathy Hwang, Shadow Governance, 108 Calif. L. Rev. 1097–1146 (2020)
• Elizabeth Pollman, Private Company Lies, 109 Geo. L.J. 353–403 (2020)
• Guhan Subramanian & Annie Zhao, Go-Shops Revisited, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1215–79 (2020)
• Andrew F. Tuch, Reassessing Self-Dealing: Between No Conflict and Fairness, 88 Fordham L. Rev. 939–98 (2019)

2019

• Ian Ayres & Edward Fox, Alpha Duties: The Search for Excess Returns and Appropriate Fiduciary Duties, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 445–515 (2019)
• Adam Badawi & Elisabeth de Fontenay, Is There a First-Drafter Advantage in M&A?, 107 Calif. L. Rev. 1119–72 (2019)
• Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 Columbia L. Rev. 2029–2146 (2019)
• John C. Coffee, Jr., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Joshua R. Mitts, & Robert E. Bishop, Activist Directors and Agency Costs: What Happens When an Activist Director Goes on the Board?, 104 Cornell L. Rev. 381–466 (2019)
• Lisa M. Fairfax, The Securities Law Implications of Financial Illiteracy, 104 Va. L. Rev. 1065–1122 (2018)
• Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 17–72 (2019)
• Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 263–315 (2019)
• Henry T.C. Hu & John D. Morley, A Regulatory Framework for Exchange-Traded Funds, 91 S. Cal. L. Rev. 839–942 (2018)
• Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 Duke L.J. 709–65 (2019)
• Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 155–221 (2019)
• Adriana Z. Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and “Index” Investing, 36 Yale J. on Reg. 795–851 (2019)

2018

• Yakov Amihud, Markus Schmid & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Settling the Staggered Board Debate, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1475–1510 (2018)
• Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value of Systems Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 578–631 (2018)
• James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Delaware’s Retreat: Exploring Developing Fissures and Tectonic Shifts in Delaware Corporate Law, 42 Del. J. Corp. L. 323–89 (2018)
• Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 106 Cal. L. Rev. 373–409 (2018)
• Jill E. Fisch, Jonah B. Gelbach & Jonathan Klick, The Logic and Limits of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 553–618 (2018)
• George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 227–77 (2018)
• Cathy Hwang, Deal Momentum, 65 UCLA L. Rev. 376–425 (2018)
• Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholding Voting, 43 J. Corp. L. 493–536 (2018)
• Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust for Institutional Investors, 82 Antitrust L.J. 221–78 (2018)
• Mark J. Roe, Stock-Market Short-Termism’s Impact, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 71–121 (2018)

2017

• Stephen J. Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1119–80 (2016).
• James D. Cox, Fabrizio Ferri, Colleen Honigsberg & Randall S. Thomas, Quieting the Shareholders’ Voice: Empirical Evidence of Pervasive Bundling in Proxy Solicitations, 89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1175–1238 (2016).
• Anna Gelpern & Erik F. Gerding, Inside Safe Assets, 33 Yale J. on Reg. 363–421 (2016).
• Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 767–829 (2017).
• Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-agreement Dealmaking in Complex Mergers and Acquisitions, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1403–51 (2016).
• Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103 Va. L. Rev. 411–80 (2017).
• John Morley, The Common Law Corporation: The Power of the Trust in Anglo-American Business History, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 2145–197 (2016).
• Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. Cal. L. Rev. 383–448 (2017).
• Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 1075–1151 (2017).
• Guhan Subramanian, Deal Process Design in Management Buyouts, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 590–658 (2016).

2016

• Lynn A. Baker, Michael A. Perino & Charles Silver, Is the Price Right? An Empirical Study of Fee-setting in Securities Class Actions, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1371–1452 (2015)
• Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, How Corporate Governance is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 649–702 (2016)
• Emiliano M. Catan & Marcel Kahan, The Law and Finance of Antitakeover Statutes, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 629–80 (2016)
• K.J Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 67–148 (2016)
• Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1267–1317 (2016)
• Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 Duke L.J. 191–277 (2015)
• Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 Yale L.J. 560–619 (2016)
• Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1551–1615 (2015)
• Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition, 101 Va. L. Rev. 1649–1751 (2015)
• Robert B. Thompson, Anti-Primacy: Sharing Power in American Corporations, 71 Bus. Law. 381–425 (2016)

2015

• Robert P. Bartlett, III, Do Institutional Investors Value the Rule 10b-5 Private Right of Action? Evidence from Investors’ Trading Behavior Following Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 44 J. Legal Stud. 183–227 (2015).
• Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1085–1155 (2015).
• William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Bankers and Chancellors, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1–84 (2014).
• Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 465–500 (2015).
• Anthony J. Casey, The New Corporate Web: Tailored Entity Partitions and Creditors’ Selective Enforcement, 124 Yale L.J. 2680–2744 (2015).
• John C. Coates, IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 Yale L.J. 882–1011 (2015).
• Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1359–1434 (2014).
• Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 557–624 (2015).
• Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 Yale L.J. 1554–1627 (2015).
• Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 573–642 (2015).
• Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1997 (2014).
• Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 331–95 (2015).

2014

• Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate Boards, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 1051–1119 (2014).
• Jill E. Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes? An Experiment on Mutual Fund Choice, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 605–47 (2014).
• Jesse M. Fried, Insider Trading via the Corporation, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 801–39 (2014).
• Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Director Nominations, 39 Del. J. Corp. L. 117–59 (2014).
• Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123 Yale L.J. 948–1013 (2014).
• John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 Yale L.J. 1228–87 (2014).
• Mark J. Roe, Structural Corporate Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1419–64 (2014).
• Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1235–90 (2013).
• Leo E. Strine Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 449–502 (2014).
• Guhan Subramanian, Delaware’s Choice, 39 Del. J. Corp. L. 1–53 (2014).

2013

• John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 605–56 (2012).
• Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1637–94 (2013).
• William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1815–1906 (2013).
• Stephen J. Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Who Calls the Shots? How Mutual Funds Vote on Director Elections, 3 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 35–82 (2013).
• John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and After Citizens United, 9 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 657–96 (2012).
• Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 863–927 (2013).
• Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A. Savelle, The Brouhaha Over Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 Bus. Law. 325–410 (2013).
• Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 1325–70 (2013).
• Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 Geo. L.J. 337–86 (2013).
• Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1907–88 (2013).

2012

• John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 Ind. L.J. 1345–1405 (2012).
• Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: the CARD Act and Beyond, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 967–1018 (2012).
• Robert P. Bartlett, III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 293–386 (2012).
• Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-free Jurisdiction, 98 Va. L. Rev. 935–1000 (2012).
• William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 69–168 (2011).
• Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware’s Competitive Reach, 9 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 92–128 (2012).
• Brian Cheffins, John Armour & Bernard Black, Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ Bar, 2012 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 427–501.
• Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 Emory L.J. 435–500 (2012).
• Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 849–906 (2012).
• Richard Squire, How Collective Settlements Camouflage the Costs of Shareholder Lawsuits, 62 Duke L.J. 1–78 (2012).
• Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative Shareholder Suits and its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1753–1819 (2012).

2011

• Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse Termination Fees, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1161–1240 (2010).
• Stephen J. Choi, Motions for Lead Plaintiff in Securities Class Actions, 40 J. Legal Stud. 205–244 (2011).
• Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government is the Controlling Shareholder, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 1293–1364 (2011).
• Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1347–1434 (2011).
• Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 1209–46 (2011).
• Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of Entrustment, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1105–63 (2011).
• Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 Law & Contemp. Probs. 137–48 (2011).
• Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 846–903 (2011).
• Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1583–1672 (2010).
• Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 323–64 (2011).

2010

• Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. Corp. L. 469–98 (2010).
• Lucian A. Bebchuk & Ehud Kamar, Bundling and Entrenchment, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1549–95 (2010).
• Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 Geo. L.J. 247–87 (2010).
• William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 653–728 (2010).
• Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 Yale L.J. 848–924 (2010).
• Stephen J. Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 Emory L.J. 869–918 (2010).
• Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 987–1051 (2010).
• Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Shrinking Half-Life, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 125–54 (2009).
• Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1151–1213 (2010).
• Leo E. Strine, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti, & Jeffrey M. Gorris, Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 Geo. L.J. 629–96 (2010).

2009

• Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 755–832 (2009).
• Robert P. Bartlett, III, Going Private But Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 7 (2009).
• Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1803–82 (2008).
• William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. Corp. L. 99–152 (2008).
• Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 649–702 (2009).
• Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 Emory L.J. 713–59 (2009).
• Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic & Eric Talley, Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis, 25 J.L. Econ. & Org. 107–33 (2009).
• Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1025–83 (2009).
• Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1315–79 (2009).
• Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 129–75 (2009).

2008

• Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1255–1308 (2008).
• Chris Brummer, Corporate Law Preemption in an Age of Global Capital Markets, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1067–1114 (2008).
• Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1021–57 (2007).
• Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 315–54 (2008).
• James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, There Are Plaintiffs and … There Are Plaintiffs: an Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 355–86 (2008).
• M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation When Agency Costs Are Low, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1543–1618 (2007).
• Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 625–739 (2008).
• Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 Geo. L.J. 1227–81 (2008).
• Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. Corp. L. 1–20 (2007).
• Guhan Subramanian, Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and Implications, 63 Bus. Law. 729–60 (2008).

2007

• Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 Geo. L.J. 1795–1842 (2007).
• Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 Va. L. Rev. 675–732 (2007).
• Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1489–1533 (2006).
• John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1534–86 (2006).
• James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1587–1640 (2006).
• Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choice of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1975–2013 (2006).
• Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1465–1568 (2007).
• Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021–93 (2007).
• Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1817–55 (2007).
• Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 460–527 (2006).
• Guhan Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freeze-outs: Theory and Evidence, 36 J. Legal Stud. 1–26 (2007).

2006

• Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1735–58 (2006).
• Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1784–1813 (2006).
• Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1055–1159 (2006).
• Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 Wash U. L.Q. 869–905 (2005).
• James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 411–54 (2005).
• Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641–79 (2006).
• Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 Duke L.J. 711–82 (2006).
• Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1333–1403 (2006).
• Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms, 61 Bus. Law. 1011–70 (2006).
• Marcel Kahan, The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection?, 22 J.L. Econ. & Org. 340–65 (2006).
• Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1573–1622 (2005).
• D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 315–56 (2005).

2005

• Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833–914 (2005).
• William W. Bratton, The New Dividend Puzzle, 93 Geo. L.J. 845–95 (2005).
• Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733–869 (2005).
• Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 Bus. Law. 439–69 (2005).
• Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 2171–2216 (2005).
• Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 209–51 (2005).
• Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2491–2543 (2005).
• Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 1521–1611 (2005).
• Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 Yale L.J. 2–70 (2005).
• Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1747–93 (2004).
• Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1797–1881 (2004).

2004

• Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder Choice, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 577–666 (2003).
• Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 83–130 (2004).
• Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & Econ. 383–425 (2003).
• Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 387–455 (2003).
• Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 785–843 (2003).
• Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588–646 (2003).
• Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 456–95 (2004).
• Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: an Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. Corp. L. 635–69 (2003).
• Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 Yale L.J. 621–86 (2003).
• Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 32–59 (2004)
• Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 133–209 (2004).

2003

• Ian Ayres & Stephen J. Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 313-408 (2002).
• Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547-606 (2003).
• Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1775-1821 (2002).
• Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates, IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 885-917 (2002).
• Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 Yale L.J. 269-346 (2003).
• Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1559-1611 (2002).
• Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 874-916 (2003).
• Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 679-749 (2002).
• Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 135-188 (2002).
• A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 Duke L.J. 841-949 (2003).
• Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 859-910 (2003).

2002

• William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 859-895 (2001) and 56 Bus. Law. 1287 (2001).
• Ian Ayres & Joe Bankman, Substitutes for Insider Trading, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 235-254 (2001).
• Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751-846 (2002).
• Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887-951 (2002).
• Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 521-566 (2002).
• William M. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1275-1361 (2002).
• John C. Coates, IV., Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1301-1421 (2001).
• Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 871-915 (2002).
• Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-off Between Individual and Collective Rights, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1040-1089 (2002).
• Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. Legal Stud. 233-271 (2002).
• Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: ”Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 261-326 (2001).

2001

• Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781-855 (2001).
• John C. Coates, IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 271-382 (2000).
• John C. Coates, IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 307-396 (2000).
• John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1-82 (2001).
• Stephen J. Choi, The Unfounded Fear of Regulation S: Empirical Evidence on Offshore Securities Offerings, 50 Duke L.J. 663-751 (2000).
• Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. Econ. & Org. 83-120 (2001).
• Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 Yale L.J. 387-440 (2000).
• Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 Geo. L.J. 797-832 (2001).
• Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. Legal Stud. 1-31 (2001).
• Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 539-606 (2000).
• Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 Yale J. on Reg. 174-251 (2001).

2000

• William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 213-297 (1999).
• John C. Coates, IV., Empirical Evidence on Structural Takeover Defenses: Where Do We Stand?, 54 U. Miami L. Rev. 783-797 (2000).
• John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure, 25 J. Corp. L. 1-39 (1999).
• Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1061-1100 (2000).
• Merritt B. Fox, Retained Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1335-1419 (1999).
• Jesse M. Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 421-477 (2000).
• G. Mitu Gulati, William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 887-948 (2000).
• Henry T.C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 777-884 (2000).
• Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 749-827 (2000).
• David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 440-504 (2000).
• Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 214-268 (1999).
• Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 31-81 (2000).
• Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 215-242 (1999).

1999

• Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-ups?, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 289-308 (1999).
• Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. Law. 921-963 (1999).
• Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247-328 (1999).
• John C. Coates, IV, “Fair Value” As an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251-1359 (1999).
• John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641-707 (1999).
• Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1253-1292 (1999).
• Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 Tul. L. Rev. 409-495 (1998).
• Kimberly D. Krawiec, Derivatives, Corporate Hedging, and Shareholder Wealth: Modigliani-Miller Forty Years Later, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1039–1104.
• Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1319-1343 (1999).
• Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences By Investors and Others, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 87-125 (1999).
• Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 Yale L.J. 277-375 (1998).
• Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197-1311 (1999).

1998

• William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 715-780 (1998).
• Stephen J. Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 916-966 (1998).
• John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern Securities Regulation, 52 Bus. Law. 1195-1233 (1997).
• Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101-172 (1997).
• Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 629-676 (1997).
• Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86 Geo. L.J. 1-44 (1997).
• Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1145-1194 (1998).
• Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1009-1107 (1997).
• Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359-2430 (1998).
• Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1018-1094 (1998).
• David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1325-1398 (1998).
• Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Should Labor Be Allowed to Make Shareholder Proposals?, 73 Wash. L. Rev. 41-80 (1998).

1997

• Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1487-1537 (1996).
• Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687-779 (1997).
• Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 595-665 (1997).
• William J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. Legal Stud. 303-329 (1997).
• Stephen J. Choi, Company Registration: Toward a Status-Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 567-651 (1997).
• Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2498-2632 (1997).
• Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1539-1571 (1996).
• Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1453-1500 (1997).
• Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U.L. Rev. 865-898 (1997).
• David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 Va. L. Rev. 127-175 (1997).

1996

• Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1911 (1996).
• Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 327 (1996).
• Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging Expectations: ”Derivative Reality” and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 21 J. Corp. L. 3 (1995).
• Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 347 (1996).
• Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 Brooklyn L. Rev. 763 (1995).
• Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law From Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 627 (1996).
• Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U.L. Rev. 898 (1996).
• Ira M. Millstein, The Professional Board, 50 Bus. Law. 1427 (1995).
• Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law, 84 Geo. L.J. 1 (1995).
• George G. Triantis & Daniels, Ronald J., The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 1073 (1995).

1995

Corporate Law

• Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 Yale L.J. 325-391 (1995).
• Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 649 (1995).
• Henry T.C. Hu, Heeding Expectations: ”Derivative Reality” and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 985-1040 (1995).
• Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. 565-622 (1995).
• Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757-852 (1995).
• Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry Into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 477-537 (1995).
• Mary Siegel, Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 Harv. J. on Legis. 79-143 (1995).

Securities Regulation

• Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 727-747 (1995).
• Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 7-37 (1994).
• Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1047-1112 (1995).
• Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 438 (1994).
• Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 649-702 (1995).
• Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Mark Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 Va. L. Rev. 611 (1995).
• Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 Yale L.J. 2053-2127 (1995).

1994

Corporate Law

• Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 Yale L.J. 1739-1834 (1994).
• Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 124-192 (1994).
• Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear From Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & Econ. 757-802 (1993).
• Reiner Kraakman, Hyun Park & Steven Shavell, When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 Geo. L.J. 1733-1775 (1994).
• Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 Duke L.J. 425–491 (1993).
• Dale A. Oesterle & Alan R. Palmiter, Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder Voting Cases, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 485-583 (1994).
• John Pound, The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003-1071 (1993).
• David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471-557 (1994).
• Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1-41 (1994).

Securities Regulation

• Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1421-1469 (1994).
• Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Under the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 19 J. Corp. L. 1-40 (1993).
• Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1997-2087 (1994).
• Richard A. Booth, The Efficient Market, portfolio Theory, and the Downward Sloping Demand Hypothesis, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1187-1212 (1993).
• John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 Cardozo L. Rev 837-907 (1994).
• Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2088-2203 (1994).
• Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 961-1024 (1994).
• Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 909-949 (1994).
• Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 987-1031 (1994).