New York Times Dealbookによるインサイダー取引の被害者に関する記事です。
Although the Justice Department did not oppose the request, it argued that the investors in Elan and Wyeth did not qualify as victims of SAC’s crimes, a term defined in the Crime Victims Rights Act as one who was “directly and proximately harmed” by the violation. A letter filed by the prosecutors stated that “an individual who happens to buy or sell securities at the same time as an insider trading defendant is not considered a ‘victim’ under the C.V.R.A. because that individual was denied the opportunity to make the same illegal profits obtained by the defendant.”
Fairness can be defined in various ways. Most of these definitions, however, collapse into the various efficiency-based rationales for prohibiting insider trading. We might define fairness as fidelity, for example, by which I mean the notion that an agent should not cheat her principal. But this argument only has traction if insider trading is in fact a form of cheating, which in turn depends on how we assign the property right to confidential corporate information. Alternatively, we might define fairness as equality of access to information, but this definition must be rejected in light of Chiarella’s rejection of the Texas Gulf Sulphur equal access standard. Finally, we might define fairness as a prohibition of injuring another. But such a definition justifies an insider trading prohibition only if insider trading injures investors, which seems unlikely for the reasons discussed in the next section. Accordingly, fairness concerns need not detain us further; instead, we can turn directly to the economic arguments against insider trading.