月別アーカイブ: 7月 2014

エクイティは枕で負債は剣

昔，David L. Yermack先生の授業で出てきた時に印象に残ったにもかかわらず，文献名を知らなかったのですが，思い出して調べて見たところ，15分ほどで見つかりました。

Equity is soft, debt hard. Equity is forgiving, debt insistent. Equity is a pillow, debt a sword. Equity and debt are the yin and yang of corporate finance. Equity lulls management to sleep, forgiving their sins more readily than a death-bed priest. A surplus of stock muffles the alarms that should be heard when earnings decline. Forgive and forget is equity’s creed. Debt’s edge jabs management awake, demanding attention. A staggering debt load is a credible threat, compelling necessary changes and exceptional performance.

Damodaran先生は，pillowではなく，cushionを使っているようです1 。どちらの方が良いのでしょうか2 。

  1. Aswath Damodaran, The Debt-Equity Trade Off: The Capital Structure Decision (2003), http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/ovhds/ch7.pdf [↩]
  2. “Equity” “pillow” “debt” “sword”でGoogle先生に尋ねると，検索結果が670万件ほど出てきます。”pillow”を”cushion”に替えると560万件ほどになります。 [↩]

訴訟費用の敗訴原告負担を定める附属定款(fee-shifting bylaws)— (1) bylawsの例

Litigation Costs. To the fullest extent permitted by law, in the event that (i) any current or prior stockholder or anyone on their behalf (“Claiming Party”) initiates or asserts any claim or counterclaim (“Claim”) or joins, offers substantial assistance to, or has a direct financial interest in any Claim against the Corporation and/or any Director, Officer, Employee or Affiliate, and (ii) the Claiming Party (or the third party that received substantial assistance from the Claiming Party or in whose Claim the Claiming Party had a direct financial interest) does not obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy sought, then each Claiming Party shall be obligated jointly and severally to reimburse the Corporation and any such Director, Officer, Employee or Affiliate, the greatest amount permitted by law of all fees, costs and expenses of every kind and description (including but not limited to, all reasonable attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses) (collectively, “Litigation Costs”) that the parties may incur in connection with such Claim.

via Brian JM Quinn

本社から離れた場所で開催する株主総会は，つまり…

M&A Law Profが面白い論文として，Temple大学のLi教授とNYUのYermack教授のEvasive Shareholder Meetingsを挙げていました。

OK, I’ll just say it. I think David Yermack is the most talented selector of paper topics out there. His series of tailspotter papers was great.

この論文は，株主総会がどれくらい本社から離れているかと，企業の業績等についての相関関係を調べた実証研究です。

We study the location and timing of annual shareholder meetings. When companies move their annual meetings a great distance from headquarters, they tend to announce disappointing earnings results and experience pronounced stock market underperformance in the months after the meeting. Companies appear to schedule meetings in remote locations when the managers have private, adverse information about future performance and wish to discourage scrutiny by shareholders, activists, and the media. However, shareholders do not appear to decode this signal, since the disclosure of meeting locations leads to little immediate stock price reaction. We find that voter participation drops when meetings are held at unusual hours, even though most voting is done electronically during a period of weeks before the meeting convenes.

M&A Law Profは目の付け所が面白いと仰っています。確かに，なかなか思いつかないアプローチだと思います。実証研究が可能な程度のサンプルがあるテーマ（一万弱となっています）というのは思いの他多いのかもしれません。最近，実証研究のテーマを考えていたのですが，創造的になれば，幾らでもテーマというのはあるのだと思い知らされました。

via M&A Law Prof Blog, SSRN