最近のデラウェア州における企業価値算定手法について

 今日の最終講義には、様々な点で大変感銘を受けました。自分の勉強が足りないことを感じましたし、新しい示唆というものは幾らでもあるものだと感じました。最終講義の中で、最近のデラウェア州における企業価値算定手法について言及がありました。拙著『証券市場における情報開示の理論』80頁注205(弘文堂,2016)では、次の通り言及しています。

デラウェア州の裁判所は,価値評価の方法について,「金融業界で受け入れられていると一般に考えられている方法」と述べた上で,価値評価の技術革新に応じて,違った価値評価の方法を受け入れている。Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983); Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 517 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Strine, V.C.), aff’d, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010) (資本コストの算定に際し,かつて衡平法裁判所が採用した歴史的なエクイティ・リスク・プレミアムではなく,長期的なエクイティ・リスク・プレミアムの期待値を採用した事例。裁判所は,専門家の新たな意見を採用することの意義について言及している).

 より詳しくは、同事件におけるTestimony of Petitioners’ Expert Witness, Paul A. Gompers, 2009 WL 8399149 (Oct. 15, 2009)をご参照下さい。

VW Ruling – Morrison Not A Bar To Securities Claims Involving ADRs

These issues arose again the U.S. securities class action lawsuit that Volkswagen ADR investors filed against the company and related defendants based on allegations involving the company’s recent high-profile vehicle emissions scandal. The Volkswagen defendants argued in reliance on Morrison that the U.S. securities laws do not apply to the OTC transactions in the company’s ADRs. In an interesting January 4, 2017 opinion (here), Northern District of California Judge Charles R. Breyer held that the U.S. securities laws do indeed apply to over-the-counter transactions in the U.S. of Volkswagen’s sponsored Level 1 ADRs.

東芝との違い:Volkswagenでは、sponsored ADRだった。

Appraising the ‘Merger Price’ Appraisal Rule

This paper develops an analytic framework combining agency costs, auction design and shareholder voting to study how best to measure “fair value” for dissident shareholders in a post-merger appraisal proceeding. Our inquiry spotlights an approach recently embraced by some courts that benchmarks fair value against the merger price itself, at least in certain situations. As a general matter, the “Merger Price” (MP) rule tends to depress both acquisition prices and target shareholders’ expected welfare relative to both the optimal appraisal policy and several other plausible alternatives. In fact, we demonstrate that the MP rule is strategically equivalent to nullifying appraisal rights altogether. Although the MP rule may be warranted in certain circumstances, our analysis suggests that such conditions are unlikely to be widespread and, consequently, the rule should be employed with caution. Our framework also helps explain why a healthy majority of litigated appraisal cases using conventional fair-value measures result in valuation assessments exceeding the deal price—an equilibrium phenomenon that is an artifact of rational, strategic behavior (and not necessarily an institutional deficiency, as some assert). Finally, our analysis facilitates better understanding of the strategic and efficiency implications of recent reforms allowing “medium-form” mergers, as well as an assortment of (colorfully named) appraisal-related practices, such as blow provisions, drag-alongs, and “naked no-vote” fees.

via Harvard

簡易なデラウェア州一般会社法

作成者は、華麗な経歴を持つハーバード・ロー・スクールのHolger Spamann教授です。次のURLからアクセスできます。

 前に、「読めるデラウェア州会社法」を紹介したことがありますが、こちらはそれよりもさらに進んだ試みといえそうです。

 例えば、デラウェア州一般会社法251条(a)項は、次の通り規定しています。

(a) Any 2 or more corporations existing under the laws of this State may merge into a single corporation, which may be any 1 of the constituent corporations or may consolidate into a new corporation formed by the consolidation, pursuant to an agreement of merger or consolidation, as the case may be, complying and approved in accordance with this section.

 これが、次の通り簡略化されています。

a. [principle] Corporations may merge into a single corporation (which may be either of the constituent corporations) or consolidate into a new corporation formed by the consolidation, pursuant to an agreement of merger or consolidation (“the agreement”).

 過度な期待は禁物ですが、面白い試みであるように思います。

Annual Review of Key Delaware Corporate and Commercial Decisions 2016

Francis G.X.Pileggi writes:

Delaware Supreme Court

  • Hazout v. Tsang

  • Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec.

  • OptimisCorp v. Waite.

  • El Paso Pipeline GP Co., LLC v. Brinckerhoff

Delaware Court of Chancery

  • Marino v. Patriot Rail Company LLC.

  • In Re Trulia Inc. Stockholder Litigation.

  • Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc.

  • Obeid v. Hogan

  • Medicalgorithmics S.A. v. AMI Monitoring, Inc.

  • Bizzarri v. Suburban Waste Services, Inc.

  • Larkin v. Shah.

Morris James:

  • In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016)

  • Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151 (Del. 2016) (ORDER); In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litigation, 143 A.3d 727 (Del. Ch. 2016); Larkin v. Shah, 2016 WL 4485447 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2016)

  • Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo!, Inc., 132 A.3d 752 (Del. Ch. 2016)

  • Hazout v. Tsang, 134 A.3d 274 (Del. 2016)

  • Sandys v. Pincus, 2016 WL 7094027 (Del. Dec. 5, 2016)

  • In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc., 2016 WL 3186538 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016)

  • In re Books-A-Million Stockholder Litigation, 2016 WL 5874974 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2016)

  • In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 2016 WL 2908344 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2016)

  • El Paso Pipeline GP Company LLC v. Brinckerhoff, 2016 WL 7380418 (Del. Dec. 20, 2016)

via Francis G.X.Pileggi