The free dividend fallacy could be costing you

  • The free dividend fallacy could be costing you

We show that many individual investors, mutual funds and institutions trade as if dividends and capital gains are separate disconnected attributes, not fully appreciating that dividends come at the expense of price decreases. Behavioral trading patterns (e.g. the disposition eect) are driven by price changes excluding dividends. Investors treat dividends as a separate stable income stream, holding high dividend-yield stocks longer and displaying less sensitivity to their price changes. Demand for dividends is systematically higher in periods of low interest rates and poor market performance, leading to high valuations and lower future returns for dividend-paying stocks. Investors rarely reinvest dividends into the stocks from which they came, instead purchasing other stocks. This creates predictable marketwide price increases on days of large aggregate dividend payouts, concentrated in stocks not paying dividends.


Marc Bellemare writes:



via himaginary氏

Leidos, Inc. v. Indiana Public Retirement System

Kevin LaCroix:

The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to take up a case that will address a recurring issue that has arisen in the securities class action litigation arena – that is, whether or not the alleged failure to make a disclosure required by Item 303 of Reg. S-K is an actionable omission under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.

Thomas O. Gorman:

The Supreme Court agreed to hear another securities case this week. Leidos, Inc. v. Indiana Public Retirement System, No. 16-581. … Leido , a securities class action based on Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, presents the following question, according to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari: “Whether the Second Circuit erred in holding – in direct conflict with the decisions of the Third and Ninth Circuits – that Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K creates a duty to disclose that is actionable under the Section 10(b) . . .” of the Exchange Act.



フォックスが引用したテキサス大学のダニエル・ハマーメッシュ*1の2013年のJournal of Economic Literature論文によると、主要誌に掲載された理論系論文の割合は、1983年のピーク時には6割程度に達していたが、2011年には3割を切ったとのことである。低下のかなりの割合は1993年までに起きているが、その明らかな理由の一つはパソコンの普及である、とフォックスは述べている。その後のインターネット時代の到来と資料のデジタル化によって、公表データをそのまま使うのではなく独自にデータを加工した研究が増え、それが1993年以降の実証系研究の増加の殆どであった、とフォックスは言う。またフォックスは、実験経済学の研究が増えていることも指摘している。

via himaginary氏

N. Gregory Mankiw, What the President Could Learn From Professional Economists, New York Times, March 10, 2017

A second cause of slower economic growth is the decline in productivity growth, which has occurred not just in the United States but in most advanced economies. The reason for this slowdown is not fully understood, but I recently heard one explanation at a seminar given by the Stanford University economist Charles I. Jones.

According to a recent paper by Mr. Jones and three co-authors, the number of Americans engaged in research has increased more than twentyfold since the 1930s, yet there has been no similar explosion in productivity growth. Their interpretation is that big ideas are just getting harder to find. Unfortunately, there is no sign that this is about to change.



Podcast with Vice Chancellor Laster

In a recent podcast, the Columbia Law School BlueSky Blog features Delaware Vice Chancellor Laster – whose appraisal decisions we have covered repeatedly – discussing the appraisal remedy. While the entire podcast is certainly worth a listen, some important topics include the history of appraisal (~1:30); when markets may depart from fair value (~5:50); how appraisal may act as a reserve price (~9:30); the discovery burden in appraisal (~14:20); interest rates and the relevance of interest (~21:30); how to determine fair value (~23:30); and the future of appraisal (~29:00).

via Columbia

The Call for a Statutory Insider Trading Law

Judge Jed S. Rakoff (S.D.N.Y.) recently made headlines after urging lawyers to draft and advocate for a more straightforward insider trading statute to replace judicially-created insider trading law. During his keynote speech at the New York City Bar’s annual Securities Litigation & Enforcement Institute, Judge Rakoff explained that the law has become overly-complicated since courts were forced to define insider trading by shoehorning the concept into the fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. As a result, increasingly suspect theories have been developed to address potential insider trading in an expanding variety of scenarios.