By instructing the court to “take into account all relevant factors” in determining fair value, the statute requires the Court of Chancery to give fair consideration to “proof of value by any techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community and otherwise admissible in court.” Given that “[e]very company is different; every merger is different,” the appraisal endeavor is “by design, a flexible process.”
This Court has relied on the statutory requirement that the Court of Chancery consider “all relevant factors” to reject requests for the adoption of a presumption that the deal price reflects fair value if certain preconditions are met, [*40] such as when the merger is the product of arm’s-length negotiation and a robust, non-conflicted market check, and where bidders had full information and few, if any, barriers to bid for the deal.
… Further, the Court of Chancery’s analysis ignored the efficient market hypothesis long endorsed by this Court. It teaches that the price produced by an efficient market is generally a more reliable assessment of fair value than the view of a single analyst, especially an expert witness who caters her valuation to the litigation imperatives of a wellheeled client.
… Fair value entails at minimum a price some buyer is willing to pay—not a price at which no class of buyers in the market would pay.
When an asset has few, or no, buyers at the price selected, that is not a sign that the asset is stronger than believed—it is a sign that it is weaker. This fact should give pause to law-trained judges who might attempt to outguess all of these interested economic players with an actual stake in a company’s future. This is especially so here, where the Company worked hard to tell its story over a long time and was the opposite of a standoffish, defensively entrenched target as it approached the sale process free of many deal-protection devices that may prevent selling companies [*73] from attracting the highest bid. Dell was a willing seller, ready to pay for credible buyers to do due diligence, and had a CEO and founder who offered his voting power freely to any topping bidder.
via Wachtell Lipton
The Trump administration on Wednesday abandoned its defense of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s in-house judicial system, siding with opponents who say the hiring process for the SEC’s judges is unconstitutional. In a brief filed with the U.S. Supreme Court, lawyers for the Justice Department wrote they now consider the SEC’s administrative law judges to be officers like other presidential appointees, instead of employees who are picked through a human-resources process. That means the way the SEC hires the judges may violate a constitutional clause that safeguards separation-of-powers principles.
The Justice Department’s brief didn’t explicitly describe the judges’ appointments as unconstitutional, but said the selection process for the in-house judge at issue in the case “did not conform” to a constitutional requirement. Mark Perry, a partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP who represented the challengers, said the Supreme Court’s involvement is still needed to resolve a disagreement between lower courts over the judges’ status. The Supreme Court would have to appoint an outside party to argue the case since the Justice Department has turned its back on defending it, the brief says. “We are one step closer to victory,” Mr. Perry said Wednesday.
The SEC didn’t sign the Justice Department’s brief. The regulator likely felt it couldn’t join the position because SEC commissioners have previously issued opinions in contested cases stating that judges are employees, not officers, said Andrew Vollmer, a professor at the University of Virginia School of Law and a former deputy general counsel of the SEC. An SEC spokesman declined to comment.