Salladay v. Lev, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 78, 2020 WL 954032 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 2020) (Glasscock, V.C.)

  • Salladay v. Lev, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 78, 2020 WL 954032 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 2020) (Glasscock, V.C.)

The Delaware Court of Chancery recently confirmed in Salladay v. Lev that conditioning a conflicted (but non-controller) transaction upon approval by a fully empowered, disinterested and independent special committee can restore the business judgment standard of review for the transaction (rather than the more burdensome entire fairness standard that would otherwise apply). However, the court (in an opinion by Vice Chancellor Glasscock) found that such special committee “cleansing” works only if the special committee protections are put in place prior to the commencement of discussions about what might constitute an acceptable price. In Salladay, the court held that the company chairman’s discussions with the acquirer regarding price created a price collar before the special committee was formed that set the tone for future negotiations, and therefore, the special committee’s approval of the transaction did not restore the business judgment standard of review.

via Cooley, Potter Anderson, Morris James, GD&C, S&C

𠮷本健一先生古稀記念『企業金融・資本市場の法規制』(商事法務,2020)

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