The Original Study, which examined deals announced in 2006-07, reported that a higher bid emerged during the go-shop period 12.5% of the time (6 instances out of 48 go-shop deals). Using a new database of M&A transactions over the past nine years, we find that the jump rate in the 2010-2018 timeframe was 5.6% (6 out of 108 go-shops), declining to 2.5% (1 out of 40) in the period 2015-2018. The last successful go-shop in our sample occurred approximately three years ago, in January 2016, when II-VI Inc. successfully jumped GaAs Labs’ offer for ANADIGICS, Inc. during a 25-day go-shop period.
As one of us concluded in the Original Study, “go-shop provisions can be a better mousetrap’ in deal structuring – a `win-win’ for both buyer and seller.” However, over the ensuing decade, a broader set of transactional planners distorted the go-shop technology in ways that achieve their clients’ objectives but no longer satisfy broader corporate law objectives of promoting allocational efficiency in the M&A marketplace. (footnote omitted)
Bogle founded Valley Forge, Pennsylvania-based Vanguard in 1974. Investors attracted to its low fees helped the firm overtake American Funds, managed by Los Angeles-based Capital Group Inc., in 2008 as the biggest U.S. stock and bond fund manager. Vanguard has $4.9 trillion in assets under management.
The Delaware Court of Chancery, in Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, C.A. No. 2017-0931-JTL (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2018), has declared “ineffective and invalid” provisions in three corporations’ certificates of incorporation that purported “to require any claim under the Securities Act of 1933 to be brought in federal court” (the “Federal Forum Provisions”).
Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, by Vice Chancellor Laster, ruled that “[t]he constitutive documents of a Delaware corporation cannot bind a plaintiff to a particular forum when the claim does not involve rights or relationships that were established by or under Delaware’s corporate law. In this case, the Federal Forum Provisions attempt to accomplish that feat. They are therefore ineffective and invalid.”
The factual record adequately supports the Court of Chancery’s determination, based on its application of precedent such as In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litigation and Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., that Akorn had suffered a material adverse effect (“MAE”) under § 6.02(c) of the Merger Agreement that excused any obligation on Fresenius’s part to close. (footnotes omitted)
私は，ニューヨーク大学でWachtell Liptonの弁護士（David A. Katz氏とMark Gordon氏）による企業買収の講義を受講し，そこで幾つかのメモランダムが配られてから，Lipton氏のメモランダムを興味深く拝見してきました。本ブログでも，Lipton氏のメモランダムについて，度々言及しています。しかし，Lipton氏の執筆に係るメモランダムをすべて拝見したということではありませんでした。例えば，1988年11月3日の “The Interco Case” と題するメモランダムは，このPDFを見つけるまで拝見することができませんでした。このメモランダムは，Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1931, 1959 n.95 (1991)，Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588, 626 (2003)などの論文で引用されています。今回，このメモランダムも含めて，Lipton氏の様々なメモランダムを読むことができるということで，紹介をいたします。デラウェア州会社法の歴史の実務の側面を垣間見ることができました。