In the highly anticipated decision of Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, No. 346, 2019 (Del. Mar. 18, 2020), the Delaware Supreme Court, reversing the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision, confirmed the facial validity of provisions in the certificates of incorporation of Blue Apron Holdings, Inc., Stitch Fix, Inc., and Roku, Inc. requiring all claims under the Securities Act of 1933 (the “’33 Act”) to be brought in federal courts (“Federal Forum Provisions”). Similar provisions have been adopted by dozens of Delaware corporations and are intended to address the inefficiencies of multi-jurisdictional ’33 Act litigation in light of the increasing number of ’33 Act claims filed in state, rather than federal, courts.
via Richards, Layton & Finger
See also Opinion
In the last couple of years, at the Chancery Court, chancellors have started moving away from the view that the court will determine fair value without regard to the merger price. Now, in certain circumstances (where the deal price is a product of a competitive or robust sales price) chancellors may consider merger price as one of the relevant factors for purposes of determining fair value.
Now this question has found its way to the Delaware Supreme Court and the parties are lining up on both sides. There are even amici! Two sets of amici have rolled up: on the one side there are law professors arguing that the court should be able to presumptively rely on merger price to determine fair value in an appraisal proceeding unless that price does not result from arm’s length bargaining (DFC Holdings – Bainbridge, et al). On the other are law professors arguing requiring a court to rely on merger price to determine fair value would run counter to the language of the statutory appraisal remedy and also not always reflect fair value (DFC Holdings – Talley, et al.
DFC Globalの件では、既に、amicus breifを紹介しておりますが、引用されているもののうち後者のamicus briefは、次のような書き出しです。こちらのbriefも錚々たる教授陣です。私は、独立当事者間の株式買取請求権の公正な価格が、取引価格に縛られないと思っているので、後者のbriefに親近感を覚えます。
Appellant urges the Court to adopt a rule of law in appraisal proceedings that presumptively requires the Court of Chancery to defer exclusively to the transaction price unless that price does not result from an arm’s-length process. Amici disagree: Doing so would be a trifecta of bad law, bad economics, and bad policy.
via Brian JM Quinn
Francis G.X.Pileggi writes:
Delaware Supreme Court
Delaware Court of Chancery
Marino v. Patriot Rail Company LLC.
In Re Trulia Inc. Stockholder Litigation.
Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc.
Obeid v. Hogan
Medicalgorithmics S.A. v. AMI Monitoring, Inc.
Bizzarri v. Suburban Waste Services, Inc.
Larkin v. Shah.
In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016)
Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151 (Del. 2016) (ORDER); In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litigation, 143 A.3d 727 (Del. Ch. 2016); Larkin v. Shah, 2016 WL 4485447 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2016)
Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo!, Inc., 132 A.3d 752 (Del. Ch. 2016)
Hazout v. Tsang, 134 A.3d 274 (Del. 2016)
Sandys v. Pincus, 2016 WL 7094027 (Del. Dec. 5, 2016)
In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc., 2016 WL 3186538 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016)
In re Books-A-Million Stockholder Litigation, 2016 WL 5874974 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2016)
In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 2016 WL 2908344 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2016)
El Paso Pipeline GP Company LLC v. Brinckerhoff, 2016 WL 7380418 (Del. Dec. 20, 2016)
via Francis G.X.Pileggi
Stanford Law ReviewがSalman v. United Statesについて、オンラインシンポジウムを開催しています。以下の5名の著者のエッセーが読めます。
Morrison, Matrixx, Janus, Halliburton I, Amgen, Halliburton II, Omnicareと判例評釈をしてきたのですが、次は、どうやらNewmanになりそうです。