Top 10 Corporate and Securities Articlesについて、2019年の結果を追加しました。
- Manichaean Capital v. SourceHOV Holdings, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 38 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2020)
In fulfilling the statutory mandate to account for “all relevant factors” bearing on “fair value,” Delaware courts consider a range of evidence that often includes (i) “market evidence,” such as a company’s unaffected trading price or the “deal price” following an appropriate “market check” and (ii) “traditional valuation techniques,” such as a comparable company, comparable transaction or DCF analysis. In this case, however, the parties and their experts agree that the circumstances surrounding the Business Combination disqualify market evidence as reliable inputs for a fair value analysis. Accordingly, the valuation presentation from both sides focused on DCF. In my view, that focus was well placed.
SourceHOV’s deal process (or lack thereof) undermines any reliance on deal price as an indicator of fair value. Moreover, as a private company, SourceHOV’s equity was not traded in an efficient market, so its unaffected market price is also an unreliable indicator of fair value. Without reliable market evidence of fair value, the parties were left to focus on “traditional valuation methods” to appraise SourceHOV. This, of course, places the spotlight squarely on their competing valuation experts. In other words, as I see it, this case has played out as the quintessential “battle of the experts.”
Both experts agree there are no sufficiently comparable companies or transactions with which to perform either a trading multiples or a transaction multiples analysis. Given that other valuation techniques do not fit here, both experts also agree that a DCF analysis is the only reliable method to calculate SourceHOV’s fair value. In light of the experts’ agreement, and seeing no reason to disagree, I am satisfied that a DCF analysis is the only reliable indicator of SourceHOV’s fair value. (footnotes omitted)
In re Appraisal of Panera Bread Company, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42 (Jan. 31, 2020) (Zurn, V.C.)
In this appraisal action, I must determine the fair value of each share of the subject company on the closing date of its acquisition. I find that the process by which the company was sold bore several objective indicia of reliability, which were not undermined by flaws in that process. I therefore find that the deal price is persuasive evidence of fair value, and give no weight to other valuation metrics. I deduct some synergies, but find others were not adequately proven. I undergo that synergies analysis solely to fulfill my statutory mandate, rather than to effectuate any transfer of funds between the parties, because the company prepaid the entire deal price and has no recourse for a refund under the appraisal statute.
Top 10 Corporate and Securities Articlesについて、2018年の結果を追加しました。
- Verition Partners v. Aruba Networks, 2019 Del. LEXIS 197 (Del. Apr. 16, 2019)
In this statutory appraisal case, the Court of Chancery found that the fair value of Aruba Networks, Inc., as defined by 8 Del. C. § 262, was $17.13 per share, which was the thirty-day average market price at which its shares traded before the media reported news of the transaction that gave rise to the appellants’ appraisal rights. … Because the Court of Chancery’s decision to use Aruba’s stock price instead of the deal price minus synergies was rooted in an erroneous factual finding that lacked record support, we answer that in the positive and reverse the Court of Chancery’s judgment. On remand, the Court of Chancery shall enter a final judgment for the petitioners awarding them $19.10 per share, which reflects the deal price minus the portion of synergies left with the seller as estimated by the respondent in this case, Aruba. …
Likewise, assuming an efficient market, the unaffected market price and that price as adjusted upward by a competitive bidding process leading to a sale of the entire company was likely to be strong evidence of fair value. By asserting that Dell and DFC “indicate that Aruba’s unaffected market price is entitled to substantial weight,” the
Vice Chancellorseemed to suggest that this Court signaled in both cases that trading prices should be treated as exclusive indicators of fair value. However, Dell and DFC did not imply that the market price of a stock was necessarily the best estimate of the stock’s so-called fundamental value at any particular time. Rather, they did recognize that when a market was informationally efficient in the sense that “the market’s digestion and assessment of all publicly available information concerning [the Company] [is] quickly impounded into the Company’s stock price,” the market price is likely to be more informative of fundamental value. In fact, Dell’s references to market efficiency focused on informational efficiency—the idea that markets quickly reflect publicly available information and can be a proxy for fair value—not the idea that an informationally efficient market price invariably reflects the company’s fair value in an appraisal or fundamental value in economic terms. Nonetheless, to the extent the Court of Chancery read DFC and Dell as reaffirming the traditional Delaware view, which is accepted in corporate finance, that the price a stock trades at in an efficient market is an important indicator of its economic value that should be given weight, it was correct. And to the extent that the Court of Chancery also read DFC and Dell as reaffirming the view that when that market price is further informed by the efforts of arm’s length buyers of the entire company to learn more through due diligence, involving confidential non-public information, and with the keener incentives of someone considering taking the non-diversifiable risk of buying the entire entity, the price that results from that process is even more likely to be indicative of so-called fundamental value, it was correct. …
Under the semi-strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, the unaffected market price is not assumed to factor in nonpublic information. In this case, however, HP had signed a confidentiality agreement, done exclusive due diligence, gotten access to material nonpublic information, and had a much sharper incentive to engage in price discovery than an ordinary trader because it was seeking to acquire all shares. Moreover, its information base was more current as of the time of the deal than the trading price used by the Vice Chancellor. Compounding these issues was the reality that Aruba was set to release strong earnings that HP knew about in the final negotiations, but that the market did not. As previously noted, Aruba’s stock price jumped 9.7% once those earnings were finally reported to the public. None of these issues were illuminated in the traditional way, and none of them were discussed by the Court of Chancery in a reasoned way in giving exclusive weight to a prior trading price that was $7.54 below what HP agreed to pay, and well below what Aruba had previously argued was fair value. (footnotes omitted)
via Steve Hecht, FT, Opinion, DealLawyers, Alison Frankel, Bloomberg Law, Matt Levine, The Chancery Daily, S&C, Potter Anderson, Morris James, CW&T, Ann Lipton, Baker Botts, PLC, Ropes & Gray, WSG&R, WF&G, Fried Frank, PWRW&G, Francis G.X. Pileggi
Richards, Layton & Finger, 2019 Proposed Amendments to the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (March 27, 2019)
Appraisal Rights. The 2019 Amendments make several technical changes to Section 262(d), which sets forth the provisions for notices to stockholders in circumstances where they are entitled to appraisal rights, to clarify such notice provisions and conform them to amended Section 232(a). The amendments to Section 262(d) will permit a corporation to deliver a notice of appraisal rights by courier or electronic mail (in addition to by U.S. mail). In addition, Section 262(d) is being amended to permit stockholders to deliver demands for appraisal by electronic transmission. …
- Guhan Subramanian & Annie Zhao, Go-Shops Revisited, SSRN (2019)
The Original Study, which examined deals announced in 2006-07, reported that a higher bid emerged during the go-shop period 12.5% of the time (6 instances out of 48 go-shop deals). Using a new database of M&A transactions over the past nine years, we find that the jump rate in the 2010-2018 timeframe was 5.6% (6 out of 108 go-shops), declining to 2.5% (1 out of 40) in the period 2015-2018. The last successful go-shop in our sample occurred approximately three years ago, in January 2016, when II-VI Inc. successfully jumped GaAs Labs’ offer for ANADIGICS, Inc. during a 25-day go-shop period.
As one of us concluded in the Original Study, “go-shop provisions can be a better mousetrap’ in deal structuring – a `win-win’ for both buyer and seller.” However, over the ensuing decade, a broader set of transactional planners distorted the go-shop technology in ways that achieve their clients’ objectives but no longer satisfy broader corporate law objectives of promoting allocational efficiency in the M&A marketplace. (footnote omitted)
- In Re PLX Technology Inc. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. 9880-VCL (October 16, 2018)
This massive decision is a primer on Delaware director fiduciary duty. It covers just about all the important issues, with an enormous amount of citations and explanation. It is particularly helpful in showing how directors must meet their disclosure obligations, both to their other directors and to stockholders. It is, of course, very much a product of its unique facts.
What may be its most lasting impact is its conclusion that the deal price in a merger established fair value and that yet again a DCF analysis was defective. At least for publicly traded and well shopped companies, we may be seeing the end of DCF as the preferred measure of value in Delaware. (emphasis added)
via Morris James