The Evolution of Delaware Freezeout Law

  • From UOP to MFW: The Evolution of Delaware Freezeout Law

 Kahan先生の講義や指導教授のゼミでGuhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 Yale L.J. 2 (2005)を購読したときのことを思い出しました。この分野は、判例法理の紹介が進んでいますし、ある程度研究も進んでいるように思いますが、ただ、その理論的な根拠はそれほど強固ではないように思います。ただ、理論的な研究を進めるためのとっかかりも簡単には思いつきません。2年以内にこの分野かMBOで論文を1つ書きたい(願望)なのですが、どうでしょうか。


Fernan Restrepo, Judicial Deference, Procedural Protections, and Deal Outcomes in Freezeout Transactions: Evidence from the Effect of MFW

This work next explores the effect of MFW on the gains of the target shareholders, as measured by the premium over market prices, the cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of the transaction, and the change from the buyer’s first offer to the final offer. This part of the analysis considers two hypotheses. The first hypothesis predicts that the gains of the target should be higher after MFW because shareholder voting acts as a check against negligent or captured boards, and even if boards discharged appropriately their fiduciary duties, the target shareholders can still use the threat of a veto to push acquirers to raise their offer (Subramanian, 2005, 15; Edelman and Thomas, 2015, 468; Jiang, Li, and Mei, 2016). As a result, the fact that MFW effectively incentivized MOM conditions should lead to an upward pressure on deal prices. The second hypothesis suggests, in contrast, that the target gains should remain similar after MFW because freezoeuts were already subject to significant scrutiny before 2013, and judicial scrutiny appears to be an effective substitute for procedural protections (Subramanian, 2007; Restrepo, 2013; Restrepo and Subramanian, 2015). As discussed in Section 4, the results generally support this hypothesis.