Snapchat IPO

You can now purchase and own shares in SNAP, but you will not have any right to vote on any matters that may come before the shareholders of SNAP. SNAP has three classes of common stock: Class A, Class B, and Class C. Class A common stock, which are NOT entitled to vote on matters submitted to SNAP’s shareholders, are the only shares that have been sold to the public – and Class A common stock is currently the only class of stock SNAP has registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act. This means SNAP will not be required to file proxy statements or information statements under Section 14 of the Exchange Act, unless a vote of the Class A common stock shareholders is required by applicable law.

Meanwhile, holders of SNAP’s Class B common stock are entitled to one vote per share, and holders of SNAP’s Class C common stock are entitled to ten votes per share. Holders of Class B common stock and Class C common stock will vote together as a single class on all matters (including the election of directors) submitted to a vote of the stockholders of SNAP. This means that Evan Spiegel, SNAP’s co-founder and Chief Executive Officer, and Robert Murphy, SNAP’s co-founder and Chief Technology Officer, through the 215,887,848 shares of Class C common stock that they collectively own (representing approximately 88.5% of the voting power of SNAP’s outstanding capital stock immediately following this offering) have the ability to control the outcome of all matters submitted to SNAP’s stockholders for approval (including the election, removal, and replacement of directors and any merger, consolidation, or sale of all or substantially all of SNAP’s assets). Further, if Mr. Spiegel’s or Mr. Murphy’s employment with SNAP is terminated, they will still continue to have the ability to exercise the same voting power.

here has been a fair amount of criticism of Snap’s move to publicly offer shares that do not include voting rights. Kurt Schacht, the Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Investor Advisory Committee, described the structure as “a significant concern” and a “troubling development from the perspective of investor protection and corporate governance” if it were to spur a new trend for tech companies going public. Just prior to Snap’s IPO, top fund managers including BlackRock, Vanguard, and T. Rowe Price urged companies to allocate voting rights to shareholders “in proportion to their economic interest.” The Council of Institutional Investors (“CII”) sent a letter to Snap urging its board to adopt a single-class voting structure and is now leading an initiative to exclude Snap (and any other company that sells non-voting shares to investors) from market indices managed by S&P, Dow Jones and MSCI Inc.

… The NYSE, NASDAQ, and other self-regulating organizations have rules requiring the submission of certain transactions to a shareholder vote, such as a change of control transactions or certain issuances of more than 19.9 percent of the Company’s outstanding shares. With most shareholders lacking any voting rights altogether, how Snap and other companies that may follow in their wake can cleanse such transactions via disinterested shareholder approval remains an open question.

via TheCorporateCounsel

Alibaba (BABA)の上場に関するリンク集

〔2014年9月26日追加〕

上場する証券取引所の選択

日本企業が米国に上場する可能性が少ないので,あまり議論をしても意味が無いのかもしれませんが,個人的にどの証券取引所に上場するのかという選択に興味があります。

典型例は米国で,ニューヨーク証券取引所に上場するか,NASDAQに上場するかという選択ですが,最近では,香港証券取引所
シンガポール証券取引所の可能性もあります。

また,将来的には,上海証券取引所の可能性もあると思います。

上場先にホームバイアスがあると思いますが,それを超えたところでの企業行動に影響を与える要素は,何なのでしょうか。例えば,今までテクノロジー企業がNASDAQに上場してきたのに対して,Twitterがニューヨーク証券取引所を選んだ理由は,何なのでしょうか。スペシャリスト制度が肯定されるものなのでしょうか。

via N.Y. Times Dealbook

IPO時点での買収防衛策

WilmerHaleがIPO時点での買収防衛策の導入比率に関する調査をしているので,取り上げてみます。WilmerHaleの2013 M&A Reportの15頁です。

防衛策の種類 IPO S&P 500 Russell 3000
期差選任 72% 17% 44%
組織再編および定款等の変更決議要件の加重 62% 21%から44% 21%から56%
書面決議の禁止 83% 71% 72%
株主による総会招集権限の制限 89% 47% 51%
株主提案議題の事前通知 93% 95% 92%
事業結合規制法 79% 95% 86%
詳細な要件を定めていない優先株式の発行 94% 95% 93%
複数の種類株式の発行 7% 9% 10%
裁判管轄の合意 27% 5% 5%
ライツ・プラン 2% 8% 12%

なお,事業結合規制法と裁判管轄の合意については,デラウェア州の会社に限定されています。

場会社と同様にライツ・プランを導入する会社は,減っていますが,ライツ・プランの導入が簡単な点に鑑みて,既に導入済みかを調べるのは,IPO時点にしろその後にしろ,そもそも意味がないように思えます。それよりも興味深いのは,期差選任で,大企業では解体が進んで17%しか導入されていないのに,IPO時点では,72%も導入されている点です。

IPOと企業統治関連では,PwCによるGovernance for Companies Going Public What Works Bestも興味深いです。

via M&A Law Prof Blog