Regulation S-XのRules 3-05及び Article 11の改正提案

The Securities and Exchange Commission proposed amendments to the financial disclosure requirements in Rules 3-05, 3-14, and Article 11 of Regulation S-X, as well as related rules and forms, for financial statements of businesses acquired or to be acquired and for business dispositions. The Commission also proposed new Rule 6-11 of Regulation S-X and amendments to Form N-14 for financial reporting of acquisitions involving investment companies.

When a registrant acquires a significant business, other than a real estate operation, Rule 3-05 of Regulation S-X generally requires a registrant to provide separate audited annual and unaudited interim pre-acquisition financial statements of that business. The number of years of financial information that must be provided depends on the relative significance of the acquisition to the registrant. Similarly, Rule 3-14 of Regulation S-X addresses the unique nature of real estate operations and requires a registrant that has acquired a significant real estate operation to file financial statements with respect to such acquired operation.

 わが国で米国証券取引委員会への登録が強制されるのは、様式F–4による組織再編に関するものだというワーキング・ペーパーを書いたことがありますが、それとの関係で、今回の規則提案は、実務に影響を与えるように思えます。

Go-Shops Revisited

The Original Study, which examined deals announced in 2006-07, reported that a higher bid emerged during the go-shop period 12.5% of the time (6 instances out of 48 go-shop deals). Using a new database of M&A transactions over the past nine years, we find that the jump rate in the 2010-2018 timeframe was 5.6% (6 out of 108 go-shops), declining to 2.5% (1 out of 40) in the period 2015-2018. The last successful go-shop in our sample occurred approximately three years ago, in January 2016, when II-VI Inc. successfully jumped GaAs Labs’ offer for ANADIGICS, Inc. during a 25-day go-shop period.

As one of us concluded in the Original Study, “go-shop provisions can be a better mousetrap’ in deal structuring – a `win-win’ for both buyer and seller.”  However, over the ensuing decade, a broader set of transactional planners distorted the go-shop technology in ways that achieve their clients’ objectives but no longer satisfy broader corporate law objectives of promoting allocational efficiency in the M&A marketplace. (footnote omitted)

via Harvard, SSRN

Martin Lipton Memos (2017)

  • Martin Lipton, Memos (2017)

 米国の組織再編法制の実務に影響を与え,また,近年では,企業統治の分野でも影響力を発揮している,Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katzの弁護士であるMartin Lipton氏のメモランダムを集めたものです。Lipton氏のメモランダムは,教科書や論文などで引用されることがあるのですが,古いものについては原文を入手することが困難なことが多かったように思います。

 私は,ニューヨーク大学でWachtell Liptonの弁護士(David A. Katz氏とMark Gordon氏)による企業買収の講義を受講し,そこで幾つかのメモランダムが配られてから,Lipton氏のメモランダムを興味深く拝見してきました。本ブログでも,Lipton氏のメモランダムについて,度々言及しています。しかし,Lipton氏の執筆に係るメモランダムをすべて拝見したということではありませんでした。例えば,1988年11月3日の “The Interco Case” と題するメモランダムは,このPDFを見つけるまで拝見することができませんでした。このメモランダムは,Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1931, 1959 n.95 (1991),Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588, 626 (2003)などの論文で引用されています。今回,このメモランダムも含めて,Lipton氏の様々なメモランダムを読むことができるということで,紹介をいたします。デラウェア州会社法の歴史の実務の側面を垣間見ることができました。

Fernan Restrepo, Judicial Deference, Procedural Protections, and Deal Outcomes in Freezeout Transactions: Evidence from the Effect of MFW

This work next explores the effect of MFW on the gains of the target shareholders, as measured by the premium over market prices, the cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of the transaction, and the change from the buyer’s first offer to the final offer. This part of the analysis considers two hypotheses. The first hypothesis predicts that the gains of the target should be higher after MFW because shareholder voting acts as a check against negligent or captured boards, and even if boards discharged appropriately their fiduciary duties, the target shareholders can still use the threat of a veto to push acquirers to raise their offer (Subramanian, 2005, 15; Edelman and Thomas, 2015, 468; Jiang, Li, and Mei, 2016). As a result, the fact that MFW effectively incentivized MOM conditions should lead to an upward pressure on deal prices. The second hypothesis suggests, in contrast, that the target gains should remain similar after MFW because freezoeuts were already subject to significant scrutiny before 2013, and judicial scrutiny appears to be an effective substitute for procedural protections (Subramanian, 2007; Restrepo, 2013; Restrepo and Subramanian, 2015). As discussed in Section 4, the results generally support this hypothesis.

Morris James, Where Is Delaware Corporate Litigation Going?

To begin with, it is clearly a good thing for Delaware to reject disclosure-only settlements when little value has been generated for the stockholders. Trulia is a good decision given the current legal landscape. Under it, clearly meritorious disclosure settlements still will be approved. Other cases can proceed on the merits to a pre-close injunction hearing, and may be resolved through voluntary supplemental disclosures that can benefit stockholders, or through post-close litigation where damages may be pursued. Moreover, Corwin will not affect post-close litigation where the challenged transaction is among the most scrutinized under Delaware law: deals involving a conflicted, controlling stockholder. Nor will Corwin affect post-close litigation in third-party deals where the stockholder vote was uninformed, or coerced. E.g., In re Saba Software, Inc. S’holder Litig., Cons. C.A. No. 10697-VCS (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2017).

M&Aは価格を上げるが効率性は上げない

himaginary氏が表題の記事を掲載しています。himaginary氏による,Bruce A. BlonigenとFRBのJustin R. Pierceの「Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on Market Power and Efficiency」の要旨の抄訳は,次の通り。

企業の合併と買収(M&A)が生産性と市場支配力に与える影響の研究は、その2つの効果を分離するのが難しいことから困難なものとなっていた。我々は新たに開発された技法を使い、工場レベルの詳細なデータを用いて様々な産業における生産性と値上げを別々に推計した。差の差分析の枠組みを適用したところ、M&Aが平均的な値上げ幅の増加に結び付いていることを見い出したが、工場レベルの生産性の効果についての証拠は見い出すことができなかった。M&Aが、生産をより効率的な工場に割り当て直したり、管理業務を減らしたりすることによって効率性を上昇させるか、という点についても調べたが、そうした経路についても平均的には証拠は得られなかった。企業の合併の決断の内生性という問題に対処するため様々な手法を採ったが、この結果はそれに対し頑健であった。

Influencing Control: Jawboning in Risk Arbitrage

In an “activist risk arbitrage,” a shareholder attempts to change the course of an announced M&A deal through public campaigns, and profits from improved terms. Compared to conventional (passive) risk arbitrageurs, activists target deals susceptible to managerial conflicts of interest (e.g., going-private and “friendly” deals) and deals with lower announcement premiums. Their presence increases the sensitivity of deal completion to market signals. While they block a significant proportion of planned deals, activist arbitrageurs only modestly decrease the probability that the targets will eventually be acquired (including by a third party). Finally, the strategy yields significantly higher returns than passive arbitrage.

via Harvard