附属定款中の強制仲裁条項

 米国で 附属定款の中に強制的な仲裁条項を置くということについて、議論が活発になっています。

 この議論は、比較法の検討としても興味深いです。また、比較法の論点に加えて、会社法や金商法の強行法規性の問題として捉えれば、より本格的な論文のテーマにもなりうるように思います。

 また、この議論は、Sciabacucchi v. SalzbergCyan Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fundの影響もあるようで、複眼的に捉えると米国の法制度の特徴が明らかになって面白いように思えます。

via SEC, Jay Clayton, Cooley, Alison Frankel, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, Allen & Overy, Cooley

What Else Do Shareholders Want? Shareholder Proposals Contested by Firm Management

Eugene F. Soltes, Suraj Srinivasan & Rajesh Vijayaraghavan, What Else Do Shareholders Want? Shareholder Proposals Contested by Firm Management

Shareholder proposals provide investors an opportunity to exercise their decision rights within a firm. However, not all proposals created by shareholders receive consideration. Managers can seek permission from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to exclude specific proposals from the proxy statement. From 2003-2013, we find that managers seek to exclude 40% of all proposals they receive, but the SEC does not permit exclusion in over a quarter of the cases. Of the proposals that managers seek to exclude but the SEC does not allow, 28% win shareholder support or the firm voluntarily implements prior to a vote. Our analysis of contested shareholder proposals suggests that managers often seek to avoid the implementation of legitimate shareholder interests.

Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public Elections

Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public Elections

… As a form of private electoral regulation, the proposal settlement mechanism raises issues of democratic transparency, participation, accountability, and enforcement. This Article challenges the characterization of proposal settlements as “voluntary” corporate self-regulation, provides a framework for understanding settlement-related agency costs, and shows how settlement subverts the traditional justifications for the shareholder proposal itself. Solutions that address the democratic and corporate governance problems of settlement largely overlap, suggesting a path forward.