If the Second Circuit concludes that, after Kelly, confidential government information does not constitute property, the Court could reverse the convictions on this ground while leaving unaddressed its prior holding that there is no personal benefit requirement in Title 18 insider trader cases. As the petitioners warned the Supreme Court, prosecutors in this scenario would likely treat this silence as a green light to continue to charge insider-trading crimes where there is little to no evidence of a personal benefit to the tipper, or tippee knowledge of that benefit. Of course, under such circumstances, prosecutors would not have the benefit of Blaszczak to rely on, and thus there could be litigation risk to the government depending on the facts of the particular case.
- Fir Tree Value Master Fund, LP v. Jarden Corp., 2020 WL 3885166, 2020 Del. LEXIS 237 (Del. July 9, 2020)
On appeal, the petitioners argue the Court of Chancery erred as a matter of law when it adopted Jarden’s unaffected market price as fair value because it ignored what petitioners claim is a “long-recognized principle of Delaware law” that a corporation’s stock price does not equal its fair value. They also claim that the court abused its discretion by refusing to give greater weight to a discounted cash flow analysis populated with data selected by petitioners, ignoring market-based evidence of a higher value, and refusing to use the deal price as a “floor” for fair value.
We affirm the Court of Chancery’s judgment finding $48.31 as the fair value of each share of Jarden stock as of the date of the merger. There is no “long-recognized principle” that a corporation’s unaffected stock price cannot equate to fair value. Although it is not often that a corporation’s unaffected market price alone could support fair value, the court here did consider alternative measures of fair value—a comparable companies analysis, market-based evidence, and discounted cash flow models—but ultimately explained its reasons for not relying on that evidence. Finally, Jarden’s sale price does not act as a valuation floor when the petitioners successfully convinced the court that the deal price resulted from a flawed sale process, and the court found Jarden probably captured substantial synergies in the sale price.
When a market is informationally efficient in the sense that the market’s digestion and assessment of all publicly available information concerning a company is quickly impounded into the company’s stock price, the market price is likely to be more informative of fundamental value. And how informative of fundamental value an informationally efficient market is depends, at least in part, on the extent of material nonpublic information. It is a traditional Delaware view that in some cases the price a stock trades at in an efficient market is an important indicator of its economic value and should be given weight.
via Sheppard Mullin
- Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 587 U.S. —, 2019 WL 1369839 (Mar. 27, 2019)
In this case, we consider whether those who do not ‘make’ statements (as Janus defined ‘make’), but who disseminate false or misleading statements to potential investors with the intent to defraud, can be found to have violated the other parts of Rule 10b–5, subsections (a) and (c), as well as related provisions of the securities laws, §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b), and §17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48Stat. 84–85, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §77q(a)(1). We believe that they can.
- Eric Posner, The Decline of Supreme Court Deference to Presidents
- Richard J. Lazarus, The (Non)Finality of Supreme Court Opinions, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 540 (2014)
〔2014年3月19日追記〕M&A Law Prof Blogに次の指摘があります。参考になると思います。
But here’s a wrinkle…footnote 14. In footnote 14, the Supreme Court notes that MFW could not have decided on the pleadings and would have survived a motion to dismiss even under the new standard. The pleadings, the court noted were sufficient to require discovery on all the new prerequisiting in the application of the standard…
Ultimately we’ll see to what degree footnote 14 matters. But, it does seem a little disconcerting that Strine’s project to provide a pathway to early dismissal of these kinds of cases might just move the locus of the argument to the functioning of the special committee.
Sure, that’s obviously better, but it’s not yet clear that MFW and footnote 14 will dramatically reduce incentives to bring these cases. Perhaps we will just be battling the same fight on new ground. Of course, the Chancery Court is likely to want to find ways to rule on the pleadings and my guess is that now that Chief Justice Strine is in a place to influence how the MFW standard is going to roll out that he won’t be looking to increase incentives for plaintiffs to bring these cases.
The Verified Consolidated Class Action Complaint would have survived a motion to dismiss under this new standard. First, the complaint alleged that Perelman’s offer “value[d] the company at just four times” MFW’s profits per share and “five times 2010 pre-tax cash flow,” and that these ratios were “well below” those calculated for recent similar transactions. Second, the complaint alleged that the final Merger price was two dollars per share lower than the trading price only about two months earlier. Third, the complaint alleged particularized facts indicating that MWF’s share price was depressed at the times of Perelman’s offer and the Merger announcement due to short-term factors such as MFW’s acquisition of other entities and Standard & Poor’s downgrading of the United States’ creditworthiness. Fourth, the complaint alleged that commentators viewed both Perelman’s initial \$24 per share offer and the final \$25 per share Merger price as being surprisingly low. These allegations about the sufficiency of the price call into question the adequacy of the Special Committee’s negotiations, thereby necessitating discovery on all of the new prerequisites to the application of the business judgment rule.