レギュレーションDに関する報告書

2012年2月の報告書の追補のようです。要点は,次の通りです。

  • Capital raised through Regulation D offerings continues to be large—$863 billion reported in 2011 and $903 billion in 2012.
  • Since 2009, hedge funds reported raising $1.3 trillion through Regulation D offerings. Private equity funds reported $489 billion; non‐financial issuers3 reported $354 billion. Foreign issuers account for 19% of the total amount sold.
  • Since 1993, the number of Regulation D offerings is highly, positively correlated with market performance, suggesting that the health of the private market is closely tied to the health of the public market.
  • Because there is no Form D closing filing requirement, the amount of capital raised through Regulation D offerings may be considerably larger than the amounts disclosed. Only 63% of capital sought since 2009 is reported as sold within 15 days of the first sale.
  • Rule 506 accounts for 99% of amounts sold through Regulation D. More than two‐thirds of non‐fund issuers could have claimed a Rule 504 or 505 exemption based on offering size, indicating that issuers value the Blue Sky law preemption allowed under Rule 506.
  • Consistent with the original intent of Regulation D to target the capital formation needs of small business, there have been more than 40,000 issuances by non‐financial issuers since 2009 with a median offer size of less than $2 million.
  • Form D filings report that more than 234,000 investors participated in Regulation D offerings in 2012, of which 91,000 participated in offerings by non‐financial issuers, more than double the number of investors participating in hedge fund offerings. Nonaccredited investors were present in only 10% of Regulation D offerings.
  • Only 13% of Regulation D offerings since 2009 report using a financial intermediary (broker‐dealer or finder). The real estate issuers use intermediaries the most (27% of offerings), while hedge funds use them the least (6% of offerings).
  • When an intermediary is used, commissions or fees are 6% of the offering, on average, for offerings under $1 million. The rate monotonically declines to less than 2% for offerings greater than $50 million.

via TheCorporateCounsel.net

証券クラスアクションに関する統計

証券クラスアクションに関する統計に関するKevin LaCroixによる記事です。

個人的に興味のある話題なので,どんな統計でも見ていて面白いです。興味深いのは,例えば,申立てが棄却されるまで何度訴状を訂正できるか—カリフォルニア北部と中部地区が甘い気がします。和解のタイミング—カリフォルニア中部地区が早い気がします。

何が理由なのでしょう。

via The D&O Diary

IPO時点での買収防衛策

WilmerHaleがIPO時点での買収防衛策の導入比率に関する調査をしているので,取り上げてみます。WilmerHaleの2013 M&A Reportの15頁です。

防衛策の種類 IPO S&P 500 Russell 3000
期差選任 72% 17% 44%
組織再編および定款等の変更決議要件の加重 62% 21%から44% 21%から56%
書面決議の禁止 83% 71% 72%
株主による総会招集権限の制限 89% 47% 51%
株主提案議題の事前通知 93% 95% 92%
事業結合規制法 79% 95% 86%
詳細な要件を定めていない優先株式の発行 94% 95% 93%
複数の種類株式の発行 7% 9% 10%
裁判管轄の合意 27% 5% 5%
ライツ・プラン 2% 8% 12%

なお,事業結合規制法と裁判管轄の合意については,デラウェア州の会社に限定されています。

場会社と同様にライツ・プランを導入する会社は,減っていますが,ライツ・プランの導入が簡単な点に鑑みて,既に導入済みかを調べるのは,IPO時点にしろその後にしろ,そもそも意味がないように思えます。それよりも興味深いのは,期差選任で,大企業では解体が進んで17%しか導入されていないのに,IPO時点では,72%も導入されている点です。

IPOと企業統治関連では,PwCによるGovernance for Companies Going Public What Works Bestも興味深いです。

via M&A Law Prof Blog